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I. INTRODUCTION
Panic struck South Louisiana like it never had before. Officials
scrambled to secure the state and prepare it for the inevitable
problems that would follow from the looming danger in the Gulf of
Mexico. Lookouts spotted the threat sailing across the water into
Louisiana-there were British troops sailing through Lake Borgne
on their way to New Orleans.' Even before the troops set foot on
the Louisiana mainland,2 the state legislature had already suspended
prescription for 120 days.3  Without the burden of prescription,
citizens could focus on what would become the Battle of New
Orleans .
4
The situation was somewhat familiar almost two hundred years
later with another danger looming in the Gulf of Mexico.
Louisianans once again braced themselves for the worst, and while
they did not know exactly what to expect from Hurricane Katrina,5
they knew that it would wreak havoc on the state. At first, it looked
like the city of New Orleans had "dodged a bullet." Expected
hurricane destruction would have been a relief considering what
actually occurred. What was feared unfortunately came to fruition
in a day's time when levee breaches brought the city's problems to a
whole new level. An estimated eighty percent of the city's
evacuated residents watched as the storm submerged eighty percent
Copyright 2008, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. ROBERT V. REMINI, THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS xiv (1999).
Americans first spotted the British off Lake Borgne on December 12, 1814. Id.
After defeating American gunboats on December 14th, the British made landfall
on Pea Island (in between Lake Borgne and Lake Ponchatrain) on December 16th.
Id.
2. ARStNE LACARRIERE LATOUR, HISTORICAL MEMOIR OF THE WAR IN
WEST FLORIDA AND LouISIANA IN 1814-15, at 62, 67 (Gene A. Smith ed., 1999).
The British made landfall on the Louisiana mainland on December 23, 1814 at
Bayou Bienvenu. Id.
3. 1814 La. ActsNo. 18.
4. REMINI, supra note 1, at xiv.
5. Hurricane Katrina struck the Southeast Louisiana coastline near Buras as
a strong Category 3 hurricane on August 29, 2005. It was one of the most
devastating natural disasters in U.S. history. RICHARD D. KNABB, JAMIE R.
RHOME & DANIEL P. BROWN, NAT'L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE
REPORT: HURRICANE KATRINA 1, 3 (2005), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdfTCR-
AL122005_Katrina.pdf.
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of New Orleans. 6 Amidst the chaos, it was impossible for many
people to meet their prescriptive deadlines.
One week later, Governor Kathleen Blanco responded by
issuing an executive order for the retroactive suspension of all
prescriptive and peremptive periods beginning on the date the
hurricane struck and lasting through at least September 25th.7 The
Governor followed this executive order with two subsequent orders
further extending the prescriptive and peremptive periods.8 On
September 24th, Hurricane Rita struck Southwest Louisiana and
further strained the state's resources.
9
Amidst concern that the Governor's executive orders were
illegal for want of authority to modify prescriptive periods, the
legislature (which has exclusive authority to modify prescription) 10
ratified and modified her orders." To further complicate matters,
there is concern that this legislative action was unconstitutional
because it deprived defendants of their vested riglts by retroactively
modifying prescriptive and peremptive periods.'
While it was ostensibly both rational and practical to suspend
prescriptive and peremptive periods for all legal proceedings
throughout the state in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, this
approach was problematic for two reasons: (1) there was a narrow
window (a day) within which the legislature had to act before the
suspension of prescription was either impermissibly retroactive or
neglected claims that prescribed during or after the hurricanes; and
(2) the hurricanes invariably affected litigants in different ways.
6. TIME, HURRICANE KATRINA: THE STORM THAT CHANGED AMERICA 7-8
(2005).
7. 2005 La. Sess. Law Serv. Exec. Order No. 2005-32 (West).
8. 2005 La. Sess. Law Serv. Exec. Order Nos. 2005-48, -67 (West).
9. Hurricane Rita struck Southwest Louisiana near the Texas border as a
Category 3 hurricane on September 23, 2005. KNABB ET AL., supra note 5, at 3.
10. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3457 (2007) ("There is no prescription other than
that established by legislation.").
11. 2005 La. Acts No. 6, §§ 1, 3 (enacting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:5821-
35 (2006)).
12. Memorandum in Support of Dilatory Exception of Lack of Procedural
Capacity and Peremptory Exceptions of No Cause of Action and Prescription at 6,
Carmena v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sheriffs Office, No. 538-362 (19th Jud. Dist.
Ct., Dec. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Defendant's Memorandum, Carmena].
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A better response would have been to resort to a doctrine that
Louisiana and other civil law jurisdictions have recognized for
hundreds of years for the suspension of prescription: contra non
valentem. Part II of this Comment traces the evolution of contra
non valentem from its roots in Roman law to Louisiana's treatment
of the doctrine and analyzes its application in situations where a
factual impediment prevents attorneys from complying with
applicable prescriptive or peremptive periods. Part III of this
Comment explores how other civil law jurisdictions have treated the
doctrine of contra non valentem in similar situations and also
evaluates how common law jurisdictions handle similar matters
without the doctrine. Part IV of this Comment evaluates the post-
hurricane legislation that retroactively revived prescribed claims in
terms of overbreadth and impermissible retroactivity. Finally, in
light of the challenges presented by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita,
Part V of this Comment recommends the use of contra non valentem
in future situations where a factual impediment prevents attorneys
from complying with prescriptive and peremptive periods.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Louisiana's Treatment of Contra Non Valentem
1. The Inception ofContra Non Valentem in Louisiana
In Louisiana, "[a] person may lose his right to assert a cause of
action because of passage of time by either peremption or
prescription."' 3 Prescription is a "limitation of time fixed by law for
the exercise of a right, and the effect of prescription when pleaded
by the obligor is that the obligee's untimely action is barred."'
14
Prescription is subject to suspension, interruption, or the "doctrine of
contra non valentem agere nulla curritpraescriptio.'' 15 Peremption,
however, is "a period of time fixed by law for the existence of a
13. St. Charles Parish Sch. Bd. v. GAF Corp., 512 So. 2d 1165, 1168 (La.
1987).
14. Id. Although much of the comparative analysis in this Comment does not
discuss peremption, it is addressed in the recommendations section.
15. Id.
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right"'16 that "may not be renounced, interrupted, or suspended."'' 7
Contra non valentem may not suspend peremption.
The first reported decision to apply contra non valentem in
Louisiana was Quierry's Ex'r v. Faussier's Ex'rs, where the
Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the validity of the state
legislature's prospective suspension of certain legal actions for 120
days19 in response to the Battle of New Orleans. 20 After years of
judicial experimentation, Louisiana courts recognized contra non
valentem in three general instances:
1 st. Where there was some cause which prevented the courts
or their officers from acting or taking cognizance of the
plaintiffs action; a class of cases recognized by the Roman
law as proper for the allowance of the utile tempus. 2d. The
second class of cases are those where there was some
condition or matter coupled with the contract or connected
with the proceeding which prevented the creditor from suing
or acting. 3d. The third class of cases is where the debtor
himself has done some act effectually to prevent the creditor
from availing himself of his cause of action.
21
Additionally, "[m]odern jurisprudence also recognizes a fourth
type of situation where contra non valentem applies so that
prescription does not run: Where the cause of action is not known or
16. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 3458 (2007).
17. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3461 (2007).
18. 4Mart. (o.s.)609(La. 1817).
19. 1814 La. Acts No. 18 § 1 ("Be it enacted by the senate and house of
representatives of the state of Louisiana in general assembly convened, That no
protest on any note or bill of exchange, payable to order or bearer, or on any note,
bill of exchange, or obligation for the payment of money, shall or can be legally
made, until one hundred and twenty days after the promulgation of the present
act."); Id. at § 3 ("And be it further enacted, That from and after the promulgation
of this act, no civil suit or action shall be commenced or prosecuted before any
court of record or other tribunal of this state, nor shall any execution issue or [sic]
be proceeded upon; and all proceedings in civil suits or actions, now pending
before any such court or tribunal, shall henceforth cease and be suspended during
the time this act shall remain in force."). This Act was effective in Orleans Parish
on December 18, 1814, and in the other Louisiana parishes upon its promulgation.
Id. at § 6.
20. REMINI, supra note 1, at xiv.
21. Reynolds v. Batson, 11 La. Ann. 729, 730 (La. 1856) (citations omitted).
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reasonably knowable by the plaintiff, even though his ignorance is
not induced by the defendant."
22
The instance with which we are concerned is the first: where
some condition prevented the courts from "acting or taking
cognizance" of the plaintiffs action.23 Modem recapitulations of
the four categories of contra non valentem have inaccurately termed
this first category as one "where there was some legal cause which
prevented the courts or their officers from taking cognizance of or
acting on the plaintiffs action, ' 24 even though the jurisprudence
clearly treats this category as one that embodies both factual25 and
legal26 barriers. This bifurcation is true both in Louisiana law and
other civilian jurisprudence. 27  The earliest reported decision to
mistakenly use the word "legal" to describe the first category of
contra non valentem cases without regard to factual impediments
was Suire v. Combined Insurance Co. ofAmerica.28 Over a hundred
reported Louisiana decisions have subsequently copied the same
22. Corsey v. State Dep't of Corr., 375 So. 2d 1319, 1322 (La. 1979).
23. Reynolds, 11 La. Ann. at 730.
24. Compeaux v. Plaisance Inspection & Enter., Inc., 639 So. 2d 434, 438
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., Quierry's Ex'r v. Faussier's Ex'rs, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 609 (La. 1817)
(where British hostilities in Louisiana prevented the running of prescription during
the War of 1812). See also Smith v. Taylor, 10 Rob. 133, 135 (La. 1845) (where
the plaintiff was prevented from filing suit because of the absence of the court
clerk and his deputy); FRANK L. MARAIST & THOMAS C. GALLIGAN, LOUISIANA
TORT LAW 222 (1996) (citing "war or some natural disaster, such as a hurricane"
as examples of events in the "legal cause" category).
26. See, e.g., Ayraud v. Babin's Heirs, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 471 (La. 1829) (where
the appellant was prevented from applying for an order of seizure because he was
the judge of the district and there were no provisions in law available for another
judge to grant such orders until after the cause of action prescribed).
27. 9 P.-B. MIGNAULT, LE DROIT CIVIL CANADIEN 452-53 (1916); J.
CARBONNIER, La Rfgle Contra Non Valentem Agere Non Currit Praescriptio, in
77 REVUE CRITIQUE DE LEGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 155, 164, 169 (1937).
28. 281 So. 2d 153, 155-56 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973). The Suire opinion
references the case of Reynolds v. Batson, 11 La. Ann. 729, 730 (La. 1856), which
makes no mention of the term "legal cause." Suire, 281 So. 2d at 155-56. Cf
CODE CIVIL [C. C1V.] art. 2251 (2007) (Fr.) ("La prescription court contre toutes
personnes, A qu'elles ne soient dans quelque exception dtablie par une loi."
("Prescription runs against all persons, unless they come within some exception
established by law.") (author's translation)).
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language,29 including the seminal case of Corsey v. State
Department of Corrections.3 ° This Comment is only concerned
with those situations where there is a factual impediment to meeting
a prescriptive period.
Despite its deep roots in Louisiana jurisprudence, Louisiana
courts routinely but inconsistently rejected contra non valentem in
post-Civil War cases in a way that only political strife can explain.
In Smith v. Stewart, the Louisiana Supreme Court declared the
doctrine to be against Civil Code provisions. 3' This decision
effectively overruled previous jurisprudence on the matter;32
however, the United States Supreme Court interpreted contra non
valentem to be the law in Louisiana in Levy v. Stewart,3 3 thereby
effectively overruling cases like Smith v. Stewart.34 Just days after
the Levy decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Stewart v. Kahn
that a congressional act issued in 186435 suspending prescription (or
its common law equivalent) throughout the country was
constitutional.36 The Court conceded that a "severe and literal
construction of the language [might mean that] ... [the] clause was
intended to be made wholly prospective" but chose instead to give it
retroactive effect according to what it believed was the intention of
29. Search conducted by the author on Westlaw.
30. 375 So. 2d 1319 (La. 1979).
31. 21 La. Ann. 67 (La. 1869).
32. Allain D. Favrot, The Scope of the Maxim Contra Non Valentem in
Louisiana, 12 TUL. L. REV. 244, 250 (1937).
33. 78 U.S. 244 (1871).
34. Favrot, supra note 32, at 250 (citing Smith, 21 La. Ann. 67 (La. 1869)).
35. 1 STAT. 118 (1864) ("Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
whenever, during the existence of the present rebellion, any action, civil or
criminal, shall accrue against any person who, by reason of resistance to the
execution of the laws of the United States, or the interruption of the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings, cannot be served with process for the
commencement of such action or the arrest of such person, or whenever, after such
action, civil or criminal, shall have accrued, such person cannot, by reason of such
resistance of the laws, or such interruption of judicial proceedings, be arrested or
served with process for the commencement of the action, the time during which
such person shall so be beyond the reach of legal process shall not be deemed or
taken as any part of the time limited by law for the commencement of such
action.").
36. 78 U.S. 493, 504 (1871).
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the statute.37 The Louisiana Supreme Court blatantly ignored Kahn
in deciding the case of Harrison v. Succession of Adger by
interpreting Congress' act of 1864 as strictly prospective in effect.
38
The Harrison court balked at the Kahn opinion as "simply the
recognition of the maxim, contra non valentem," which the
Louisiana Supreme Court previously held as having no place in
Louisiana law.39 Despite their continued resentment of contra non
valentem, the same five justices in TutorshV of Hewitt recognized
the doctrine in principle but without name 0 two years after they
expressly overruled it in Smith v. Stewart4' and one year before they
again refused to recognize it in Harrison.42  In due time, the
Louisiana Supreme Court reinstated contra non valentem by name
in Louisiana in 1880 with Succession of Farmer43 and formally
recognized it as law again in McKnight v. Calhoun.
44
One commentator has posited an explanation for these
inconsistent applications of contra non valentem, explaining that
refusing to apply the doctrine "spared the Court from deciding a
great political question arising out of the Civil War" such as whether
actions by agents of a rebellious government were lawful.45 This
idea holds force in light of the fact that the principle of contra non
valentem was recognized during the Civil War in matters of
tutorship46 but not when members of the Pointe Coupee Parish
militia burned two hundred seventy-five bales of cotton.47
37. Id.
38. 24 La. Ann. 565, 566 (La. 1872).
39. Id.
40. 23 La. Ann. 682, 682 (La. 1871) ("Prescription does not run against the
tutor on a claim which he has against his ward for board and lodging during the
tutorship, nor are such items prescribed until the lapse of four years after the
tutorship has terminated, that being the period of time allowed by law to the minor
after emancipation within which the tutor may be called upon for an account.").
41. 21 La. Ann. 67 (La. 1869).
42. 24 La. Ann. at 565.
43. 32 La. Ann. 1037 (La. 1880).
44. 36 La. Ann. 408 (La. 1884).
45. Vernon V. Palmer, The Many Guises of Equity in a Mixed Jurisdiction: A
Functional View of Equity in Louisiana, 69 TUL. L. REV. 7, 68 n.250 (1994).
46. Tutorship of Hewitt, 23 La. Ann. 682, 684 (La. 1871).
47. Smith v. Stewart, 21 La. Ann. 67, 76 (La. 1869).
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2. Modern Development of Contra Non Valentem in Louisiana
At first glance, it would appear that the 1982 revision of former
Louisiana Civil Code article 3521 had the effect of eliminating
48contra non valentem from law in Louisiana once again. Article
3521 formerly indicated that "[p]rescription runs against all persons,
unless they are included in some exception established by law."49
The revision ostensibly abrogated the exceptions to prescription,
stating that "[p]rescription runs against all persons unless exception
is established by legislation."50 It seems that the legislature intended
to eliminate jurisprudential favor of contra non valentem, but a
comment in the 1987 edition of the Code reveals that contra non
valentem continues to be the law in Louisiana.5 1
One commentator has criticized that the only basis for contra
non valentem is a mere comment to the Civil Code, noting, "There is
nothing strange if a new Code article sets forth a rule that codifies
the prevailing jurisprudence, but there is something very strange if
the new article has not done that and the comment alone is the basis
of the codification. 52 Nevertheless, Louisiana Civil Code article
3467 comment (d) is still the only printed recognition of contra non
valentem in the Louisiana Civil Code, as actual legislative adoption
remains to be seen. The Louisiana Supreme Court continues to
support the doctrine.53
B. The Evolution of Contra Non Valentem: Roman Roots and
French Propagation
The doctrine of contra non valentem emerged as a medieval
catchphrase in the fourteenth century. Bartolus used the phrase for
48. Vernon V. Palmer, The Death of a Code-The Birth of a Digest, 63 TUL.
L. REV. 221, 260-61 (1988).
49. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3521 (1982) (amended 1983) (emphasis added).
50. LA. Cfv. CODE ANN. art. 3467 (1983) (emphasis added).
51. Art. 3467 cmt. d (1987) ("Despite the clear language of Article 3521 of
the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, courts have, in exceptional circumstances,
resorted to the maxim contra non valentem non currit praescriptio .... This
jurisprudence continues to be relevant.") The comment remains in the code today.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3467 cmt. d (2007).
52. Palmer, supra note 48, at 261.
53. Corsey v. State Dep't of Corr., 375 So. 2d 1319, 1321-22 (La. 1979).
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various Roman law principles, stating "contra non valentem agere
non curritpraescriptio" (' rescription does not run against someone
who is unable to act"). 5  Bartolus' doctrine appears in various
comments to the Digesta, the Codex Justinianus, and the code de
annali exceptione.55 Irenius made a similar observation as early as
the twelfth century, stating "[p]raescription non currit in his qui se
velint agere non possunt." ("prescription does not run in the case of
those who find themselves unable to act").56 Early conceptions of
contra non valentem were largely relegated to legal impediments to
prescription, though other commentators did not have such a narrow
perception. 57  Nevertheless, contra non valentem emerged as an
equitable response to both factual and legal impediments to
prescription.
The Canon law, ever hostile to the concept of prescription, was
largely responsible for propagating the doctrine and broadening it to
include factual obstacles. 58 Jurisprudential support for the doctrine
grew to account for impediments such as "youth, mental disease,
dotal status, condition or term, the eventual nature of the right,
absence, lack of knowledge, [and] irresistible force." 59
As the maxim passed from Italy to France,60  French
commentators bifurcated the doctrine into factual and legal
"impossibility to act" and treated each category with tempered
circumspection. They were particularly concerned with the
plasticity with which the jurisprudence had treated prescriptive
periods and sought to reaffirm its importance:
54. CARBONNIER, supra note 27, at 157 (author's translation).
55. See G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & ALBERT TISSIER, Prescription, in 28
TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL NO. 367 n.2 (4th ed. 1924), in 5
CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 192 (1972) ("Non valenti agere non currit
praescriptio."). For an overview of contra non valentem as a source of Romanist
tradition in Louisiana law see Douglas Nichols, Contra Non Valentem, 56 LA. L.
REv. 337 (1995).
56. Id.
57. Id. C16ment indicated that that contra non valentem applied generally to
legal obstacles while factual impediments triggered in integrum restitution. Id.
Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier note that this opinion is not unanimously
accepted. Id.
58. CARBONNIER, supra note 27, at 157.
59. BAuDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 55, NO. 367, at 192.
60. CARBONNIER, supra note 27, at 157.
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[T]his new popularity of the rule Contra non valentem agere
... must not allow us to lose sight of the gravity of the
consequences. Here is an institution, prescription, which
represents a social interest of prime importance. Society has
an obvious prime social interest in these prescriptions being
brief and certain. . . .And under the cover of the maxim,
these delays will be again lengthened, a general case of
suspension will be added to the list of these special cases.
6 1
Baudry-Lacantinerie and Tissier noted, "One forgets that the
main justification of prescription is a higher social interest, which
operates irrespective of whether the interested party was or was not
prevented from acting." 62 While maintaining the social value of
suspending prescription in limited situations, Carbonnier cautioned
that "[i]t must be well admitted that such a limitation must remain
an exceptional thing and it must be set a priori that the legal rule [of
suspending prescription] is not a common practice."
63
Leaving legal applications of contra non valentem aside, French
commentators often couched impossibility to act "in fact"
(l'impossibilit d'agir en fait) in terms of force majeure.64 While
force majeure is much broader in scope than contra non valentem
alone, French common law developed three general aspects that
characterized situations where force majeure triggered the contra
non valentem defense to prescription: "1. The major force produces
61. Id. at 161-62 (author's translation) ("[C]ette faveur nouvelle de la r~gle
Contra non valentem agere... ne saurait nous faire perdre de vue la gravitd de ses
consequences. Voici une institution, la prescription, qui repr~sente un intr&
social de premiere importance. La soci~t6 a un evident int~ret A ce que les
prescriptions soient braves, certaines .... Et, sous le couvert de la maxime, ces
ddlais vont encore &re allong~s, une cause g~n~rale de suspension va 8tre ajoutde
A la liste des causes spdciales.").
62. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 55, NO. 368, at 193.
63. CARBONNIER, supra note 27, at 162 (author's translation) ("[I]l faut bien
admettre qu'une telle limitation doit rester quelque chose d'exceptionnel et l'on
peut poser a priori que la r~gle jurisprudentielle n'est pas d'une application
commune.").
64. See id. at 169. For a thorough discussion of applying the doctrine offorce
majeure post-hurricanes, see Charles Tabor, Dusting Off the Code: Using History
to Find Equity in Louisiana Contract Law, 68 LA. L. REV. 549 (2008). See also
Safil Litvinoff, Force Majeure, Failure of Cause and Theorie de l'Imprevision:
Louisiana Law and Beyond, 46 LA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985).
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an absolute impossibility. 2. It (the force) supposes a foreign
occurrence to the person who takes advantage of it. 3. It is in a
certain relationship--a relationship of exclusion, ordinarily-with
the idea of fault." 6r
The jurisprudence strictly construed impossibility in fact as
"absolute" impossibility and discounted simple difficulties as
66insufficient. Carbonnier hypothesized some illustrative examples
of force majeure, including war, civil unrest, plagues, calamities,
and anything else that could impede communications and
disorganize the justice system; 67 however, he considered these
hypothetical applications impractical because he was confident that
the legislature would develop a collective remedy when necessary.68
He was indeed at least historically correct, as the French legislature
suspended prescription during the Franco-German War of 1870-
187169 and World War 1.70 It would also suspend prescription
during World War II.7 1 As we will explore shortly, these academic
exercises proved to be much more important in light of more sudden
and unforeseeable calamities such as the aftermath of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. Moreover, the narrow window of time within
which the legislature must act to avoid retroactively reviving
65. Id. at 170 (author's translation) ("1. La force majeure produit une
impossibilitd absolue. 2. Elle suppose un fait 6tranger A la personne de celui qui
s'en prrvaut. 3. Elle est dans un certain rapport-rapport d'exclusion,
ordinairement-avec l'id6e de faute.").
66. Id.
67. Id. at 170-71.
68. Id. at 171.
69. 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TRArrtE 1tMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL, PT. 2, NO.
2704, at 597-98 (George Ripert, contrib., La. State Law Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1939)
(1899) (citing Dalloz, Sept. 9, 1870, Law of May 27, 1871, repealed by the Law of
December 20, 1879).
70. Id.; see also BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 55, NO. 370,
at 195 (citing Law of 5 August 1914, Art. 2, which was effective retroactively
from its promulgation on August 10, 1914 to August 2, 1914 ("For the duration of
the mobilization and until the cessation of hostilities the government is authorized
to take, in general interest and through the council of ministers, all the measures
necessary to facilitate the execution or suspend the effects of commercial or civil
obligations, [and] to suspend all prescriptions and prescriptive procedural terms in
civil, commercial and administrative matters .... ")).
71. PIERRE MARTINEAU, LA PRESCRIPTION, NO. 216, at 219 (1977).
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prescribed actions further illustrates the danger of relying on the
legislature to suspend prescription.
Other commentators were even more critical of unwieldy
applications of contra non valentem. Troplong, in referencing a
Cour de Cassation opinion from 1829,72 noted that war does not in
and of itself suspend prescription without something more onerous
to the individual litigant, such as a blockade:
[I]f the resulting obstacles of war and of plague manifest
themselves in an intermediary time not near to the deadline
of prescription, it must not be taken into account, as, since
the creditor is given the liberty to act, he can take the time
necessary for forcing his debtor into payment .... 73
In noting the absurdity of suspending prescription for all citizens
under the auspice offorce majeure, Troplong posited the following:
I live in a town driven into a state of blockade during the
span of a year, and 20 years still remain for me to escape the
thirty year prescription of my right: is it not absurd that I
would like to cover up my negligence in acting in this
waiting period, by asking that the year under siege not be
counted in the calculation of my thirty years? What major
force paralyzed my hands, since for 20 years, I was able to
repair this hurdle of time? ... But when the creditor has had
sufficient time to redress himself, 'force majeure" is no
longer a vain allegation, and the time thus lost, so easy to
72. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction] 1 Apr.
1829, Dalloz 1829, 206 ("L'Etat de guerre n'est pas un emp~chement de force
majeure, susceptible d'interrompre la prescription, lorsque le crrancier, qui
r6clame le paiement de sa dette, a eu la facultd d'exiger ce paiement dans un autre
lieu que celui declare en dtat de blocus." ('The state of war is not an impediment
of force majeure, susceptible to the interruption of prescription, when the creditor,
who demands the payment of his debt, had the ability to demand this payment in
another place that he declared was blockaded.") (citing C. civ. 2251 (Fr.))
(author's translation)).
73. 2 M. TROPLONG, DROIT CIVIL EXPLIQUE :DE LA PRESCRIPTION, NO. 728,
at 299 (1857) (author's translation) ("[S]i l'empchement provenant de la guerre et
de la peste se manifeste dans un temps intermddiaire et non voisin de l'chance
de la prescription, on ne doit pas en tenir compte, si, depuis que le cr~ancier est
rendu i la libert6 d'agir, il a eu tout le temps ndcessaire pour forcer son ddbiteur au
payement. .. ").
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repair, just as the time of an apoplexy, or fever, or grief. The
time of prescription is in effect regulated by law, with
sufficient latitude and favor, so that it is not necessary that
every day should be absolutely necessary. 74
Despite continued jurisprudential enthusiasm for the doctrine,
the redactors of the French Civil Code intended to reject it by
excluding it.75  Many commentators believed the redactors were
correct in doing so, as "admit[ting] the existence of the rule Contra
non valentem is to go against the very text of Art. 2251. It would
bring back all the known abuses of our old decisional law.",76 Still,
French courts continued to acknowledge and apply contra non
valentem in its broadest sense. One decision from the Cour de
Cassation noted that "prescription does not run against a person who
can not act as a result of any impediment, whether its source is law,
contract or act of God.177
Today, article 2251 of the French Civil Code remains unchanged
from its original redaction, stating that "[p]rescription runs against
all persons, unless they come within some exception established by
74. Id. (author's translation) ("J'habite une ville mise en 6tat de blocus
pendant l'espace d'un an, et vingt ann~es me restent encore pour 6chapper A la
prescription trentenaire de mon droit: ne serait-il pas ridicule que je voulusse
couvrir ma nigligence A agir dans ce dalai, en demandant de ne pas compter
l'ann~e de sidge (sic) dans le calcul des trent ans? Quelle force majeure m'a donc
paralys6 les mains, puisque, pendant vingt ans, j'ai pu r~parer cet obstacle d'un
moment? ... Mais quand le crdancier a pu se relever en temps utile et reprendre
ses avantages, la force majeure n'est plus qu'une vaine allagation, et l'on doit lui
compter cette annie qu'il a perdue et qu'il lui dtait si facile de r6parer, -tout aussi
bien que le temps d'une apoplexie, d'une fi~vre c&rdbrale, d'une agonie. Le temps
des prescriptions est, en effet, rdgld par la loi avec assez de latitude et de faveur
pour qu'il ne soit pas n~cessaire que tous les jours soient absolument utiles.").
75. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TisSIER, supra note 55, NO. 368, at 193.
76. Id. Article 2251 of the French Code Civil states: "Prescription runs
against all persons, unless they come within some exception established by law."
(author's translation) ("La prescription court contre toutes personnes, A moins
qu'elles ne soient dans quelque exception 6tablie par une loi."). C. civ. art. 2251
(1924) (Fr.).
77. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 55, NO. 369, at 193
(quoting Cass. 28 June 1870, S. 71. 1. 137, D. 70. 1. 310; 3 Jan. 1870, D. 72. 1.
22.) (emphasis added).
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law."78 Even though there is no mention of "absolute impossibility"
in the code, French jurisprudence has firmly established and
continues to hold that "[p]rescription does not run against one who
absolutely cannot act, as a result of whatever impediment resulting
from law, from agreement or from force majeure."79
III. EXTENDING LIMITATION OF ACTIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Contra Non Valentem in Other Civil Law Jurisdictions
Two jurisdictions, Quebec and Argentina, are helpful in molding
a more complete analysis of contra non valentem. Quebec's
treatment of the doctrine is useful for two reasons: first, its
commentators were just as dismissive as the French were in
applying the doctrine where there was a factual impediment to
prescription because they presumed that the legislature would act
affirmatively to address the issue; second, the law in Quebec
thoroughly evaluates whether the impediment to prescription is
couched in terms of "impossibility" or "absolute impossibility."
Argentine law is helpful to our analysis because it illustrates the
need to tailor judgments of factual impediments on a case-by-case
basis.
78. C. Civ. art. 2251 (2007) (Fr.) (author's translation) ("La prescription court
contre toutes personnes, A moins qu'elles ne soient dans quelque exception 6tablie
par une loi.").
79. Cass. 28 June 1870, S. 71. 1. 137-38, D. 70. 1. 310-11 (author's
translation) ("La prescription ne court point contre celui qui est dans
l'impossibilitd absolue d'agir, par suit d'un emprchement quelconque resultant
soit de la loi, de la convention ou de la force majeure."). Accord Cass. le civ. Feb.
18, 2003, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/Visu?cid=216693&indice=2&
table=INCA&igneDeb=l (Fr.); Cass. soc. May 6, 1999, http://www.legifrance
.gouv.fr/WAspad/Visu?cid=117755&indice=l&table=INCA&ligneDeb=l (Fr.);
Cass. le civ. Feb. 2, 1994, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/Visu?cid=
59193&indice-20&table=INCA&ligneDeb=-l (Fr.); Cass. corn. Jan. 4, 1994,
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/isu?cid=58430&indice=2&table=INCA
&ligneDeb-l (Fr.); Cass. le civ. Oct. 7, 1992, http://www.legifrance.gouv
.friWAspad/Visu?cid=45972&indice= 18&table=INCA&ligneDeb= 1 (Fr.).
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1. Quebec
Although no Quebec statute endorses contra non valentem by
name, Quebec's civil code is among the codes most supportive of
the principle behind the doctrine. On causes that suspend
prescription, the Civil Code of Lower Canada formerly indicated
that "[p]rescription runs against all persons, unless they are included
in some exception established by this code, or unless it is absolutely
impossible for them in law or in fact to act by themselves or to be
represented by others."80  Commentator Pierre Martineau
acknowledged that this article was in fact contra non valentem.
8 1
While the framers of the French Civil Code refused to include
the "impossibility to act" provision despite continued jurisprudential
endorsement, the commissioners appointed to codify the laws of
Lower Canada included it in Title Nineteenth of Book Third of the
Civil Code of Lower Canada. 2 Commissioners of both the French
and Lower Canadian civil codes were aware of the limits that contra
non valentem would place on prescription if such a general
provision were introduced, especially in light of precautions by
French commentators. 83 Nevertheless, the commissioners of the
Civil Code of Lower Canada included the "impossibility to act" as a
cause of suspension of prescription tempered by "absolute
impossibility." ' 4
As amicable as the Civil Code of Lower Canada's endorsement
of the principle of contra non valentem might seem to proponents of
the maxim, doctrinal and jurisprudential criticism of the article's
practical application had at one point significantly curtailed it.
80. CIVIL CODE OF LOWER CANADA [C.c.B.-C.] art. 2232 (1993) (emphasis
added).
81. MARTINEAU, supra note 71, NO. 343, at 353.
82. THIRD REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO CODIFY THE LAWS
OF LOWER CANADA, Reports 1-3, at 531 (George E. Desbarats ed. 1865)
[hereinafter THIRD REPORT] ("Prescription runs against all persons, unless they be
specially exempt according to law or the established jurisprudence, or that they are
unable to act.").
83. See generally Gauthier v. Beaumont, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 3, 39-40 (Can.).
84. THIRD REPORT, supra note 82, Reports 1-3, at 531 ("Prescription runs
against all persons, unless they be included in some exception established by this
code, or unless it be absolutely impossible for them in law or in fact to act by
themselves or to be represented by others." (emphasis added)).
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Though it ultimately adopted a less restrictive definition of
impossibility, the Gauthier v. Beaumont court commented on the
instant article and "stressed the word 'absolutely' at the outset
because it must be given its ordinary meaning of 'allowing for no
restriction, alleviation, or exception'; if the legislature included it in
the article, it intended to say something, and the article has been
interpreted accordingly."
85
Commentators generally noted the significance of the word
"absolutely" with varying degrees of strict interpretation. For
example, Mignault only imagined "absolute impossibility to act" in
the most extreme cases;86 however, he does not go so far as other
commentators have in requiring that impossibility be imposed by
some superior force.
87
These commentators seem to have mirrored their French
brethren by generally discounting any practical application of
85. Gauthier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. at 41 (quoting Procureur general du Qudbec v.
Garantie, Cie d'assurance de l'Amdrique du Nord, [1979] C.S. 216 (Can.)
(reversed by the Court of Appeal on other grounds, November 14, 1983, C.A.
Mtl., No. 500-09-000291-799, J.E. 83-1142)) (citation omitted). See also Oznaga
v. La Socit6 d'exploitation des lotteries et courses du Qudbec, [1981] 2 S.C.R.
113, 126 (Can.) ("Accordingly, the concept of it being 'absolutely impossible...
in fact to act,' provided for in art. 2232 of the Civil Code, should not be unduly
extended as a basis for a suspension of deadlines.").
86. 9 MIGNAULT, supra note 27, at 452-53 ("Du reste, l'impossibilit6 d'agir
doit 6tre absolue, mais elle peut exister en droit ou enfait. Comme je viens de le
dire, je crois que notre code 6nonce tous les cas d'impossibilit6 d'agir 'en droit.'
L'impossibilit6 d'agir 'enfait' 6chappe i toute ddfmition. Elle ne rdsulterait pas
de l'absence, et pas meme, A mon avis, de l'emprisonnement dans une maison de
detention. Cependant, elle pourrait exister si le crdancier ou le proprirtaire
subissait une contrainte telle qu'il serait absolument privd de moyens d'action,
mais ce cas est tellement extraordinaire qu'il ne s'est jamais, que je sache, prrsent6
dans la pratique." ("For the rest, the impossibility to act must be absolute, but it
can exist in right or in fact. Like I just said, I believe that our code lays out all the
cases of impossibility to act "in right." The impossibility to act "in fact" escapes
all definition. It couldn't result from absence nor, in my opinion, from
imprisonment in a penitentiary. However, it could exist if the creditor or the
owner are under a constraint where he was absolutely deprived of a mode of
action, but this case is so extraordinary that it has never, that I know of, been
presented in practice.") (author's translation)).
87. Gauthier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. at 41-42 (citing 9 MIGNAULT, supra note 27, at
452; 15 WITOLD RODYS, TRArrE DE DROrr CIVIL DU QUtBEC 195 (1958);
MARTINEAU, supra note 71, NO. 216, at 218-19).
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"impossibility to act in fact," yet a deeper analysis reveals that their
discussions focus on the jurisprudence and shy away from
imaginative hypothesizing. In identifying "kidnapping" as a lone
practical example to the "impossibility to act in fact," Martineau
commented on how even war may not sufficiently suspend
prescription. 88 Martineau discounted any deep study of crises like
war that could suspend prescription as merely academic because he
believed that Quebec's legislature would step in to suspend
prescription just as France's legislature suspended prescription
during the First and Second World Wars.
89
To assume that the legislature would act affirmatively to solve
Louisiana's prescriptive woes was proven unwise, as the
legislature's tardiness in suspending prescription has created
problems of impermissibly retroactive legislation. While these
commentators may have held a narrow position on what events
could stand as an "impossibility to act in fact," one could forgive
them for failing to foresee the complexities of the ramifications of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. Royds, another commentator,
likewise cited kidnapping as a lone conceivable example of
impossibility in fact but was not foreclosed to other possible
examples, stating that "our jurisprudence isn't always in accord with
the doctrine." 90 Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are prime examples of
events that will force the jurisprudence to evolve beyond examples
illustrated in doctrine.
Contra non valentem continued to be "enshrined in both the
Civil Code of Lower Canada (article 2232) and in [Qu6bec's]
88. MARTINEAU, supra note 71, NO. 216, at 218-19. See also 2 TROPLONG,
supra note 73, NO. 728, at 299.
89. MARTINEAU, supra note 71, NO. 216, at 219 ("En France, des lois
spdciales ont 6t6 adoptdes pour suspendre les prescriptions durant les guerres de
1914-1918 et de 1939-1945. Le 16gislateur qudbrcois agirait sans doute de mme
dans une situation identique; la question de determiner si la guerre et l'invasion
constituent des cas d'impossibilit6 d'agir prendrait alors un caractrre
acad~mique." ("In France, the special laws were adopted in order to suspend
prescription during the wars of 1914-1918 and of 1939-1945. The Qurbrcois
legislature would react, without doubt, in the same way in an identical situation;
the question to determine if the war and the invasion constitute cases of
impossibility to act would be academic in character.") (author's translation)).
90. RODYS, supra note 87, at 195 (author's translation) ("[N]otre
jurisprudence n'est pas toujours d'accord avec la doctrine.").
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jurisprudence." 91 Because the Civil Code of Lower Canada retained
the principle of the doctrine while the French code did not, some
Qu6bec courts veered away from French doctrine and jurisprudence
for guidance on the subject.92 Indeed, it seems as if Qu6bec chose to
endorse the doctrine notwithstanding heavy criticism by its French
ancestors and brethren.
Recodification of the Civil Code of Lower Canada into what is
now the Qu6bec Civil Code changed the article significantly. The
Qu6bec legislature modified article 2232 from the Civil Code of
Lower Canada to reflect the new, less restrictive interpretation from
Gauthier v. Beaumont by eliminating the word "absolutely" from
"absolutely impossible" in the new article as it appeared in Civil
Code of Quebec.93  The substance of article 2232 is retained in
current article 2904 of the Civil Code of Quebec: "Prescription does
not run against persons if it is impossible in fact for them to act by
themselves or to be represented by others., 94 A number of decisions
have acknowledged the revision as a less restrictive provision
allowing the suspension of prescription under "impossibility in
fact." 95  The revision also permits more judicial discretion in
91. Canada (Procureur gdn~ral) c. L4vesque, 1989 CarswellQue 1508 (Can.).
See also Joy Oil Ltd. v. McColl Frontenac Oil Co., [1943] S.C.R. 127, 138 (Can.).
92. See, e.g., Joy Oil, [1943] S.C.R. at 138 (Can.).
93. C.C.B.-C. art. 2232 (1993) (Can.).
94. C.c.Q. art. 2904 (2007) (Qudbec).
95. See, e.g., Quebec (Ville) c. Constructions Bd-Con inc., [2003]
CarswellQue 4652 (Can.) (recognizing the ignorance of a legal action sufficient to
suspend prescription when the defendant's behavior contributed to the
perpetuation of the ignorance); Ringuette c. Ringuette, [2003] CarswellQue 799
(Can.) (recognizing that article 2904 could not apply retroactively but deciding
nevertheless that the psychological trauma caused by the defendant-brother's
sexual molestation of the plaintiff-sister presented an absolute impossibility to act
sufficient to suspend prescription under both former article 2232 and new article
2904); Handfield c. Laporte, [2002] CarswellQue 2723 (Can.) (denying the
plaintiff's plea of impossibility to act in fact when the defendants were not the
cause of his psychological disabilities and because expert testimony showed that
his psychological problems did not prevent him from taking cognizance of his
ability to pursue an action); Jean-Guy Longtin c. Lise Plouffe, [2001] R.J.Q. 2635,
2649 (Can.) (recognizing the looser standard of "impossibility to act in fact" and
suspending the prescriptive period for a plaintiff whose diminished cognitive
abilities prevented her from pursuing her action until third parties helped her to
appreciate the consequences of her actions); Fiducie Desjardins inc. c. Cit6 Poste
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deciding whether a factual impediment is sufficient to suspend
prescription.
96
Massaging the definition of "impossibility in fact" and
determining whether there should be an "absolute" component to it
is indeed an important consideration in Louisiana in light of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The degree to which the hurricanes
impeded any particular litigant undoubtedly varied greatly.
Louisiana judges should carefully consider how much latitude they
are willing to afford litigants in balancing the factual impediment to
prescription and the value of prescription itself.
2. Argentina
Article 3980 of the Argentine Civil Code (C6digo Civil
Argentino) specifically provides for the application of contra non
valentem in terms of "impossibility to act in fact." The article states:
When the enforcement of an action was temporarily
impeded due to difficulties or impossibility of fact, the
judges are authorized to release the creditor, or the owner,
from the consequences of the prescription that occurred
during the impediment, if after its cessation the creditor or
owner had exercised his rights in a period of three months.
inc., [1999] CarswellQue 443 (Can.) (recognizing fraud as a factual impediment
sufficient to suspend prescription until the plaintiffs discovered the fraud); Droit
de la Famille, [1996] R.J.Q. 2981, 2992 (Can.) (allowing the suspension of
prescription for the disavowal of paternity four years after the child's birth, when
the wife told the husband there was a chance he was not the father and there was
no way for the father to know the truth until he learned the results of the DNA
test).
96. See, e.g., Jean-Guy Longtin, [2001] R.J.Q. at 2649 (Can.) ("A notre avis,
cette modification confere au tribunal une certaine discretion dans I'appr~ciation et
l'application de cette notion." ("In our view, this modification confers on the court
a certain discretion in the appreciation and application of this notion.") (author's
translation)); Droit de la Famille, [1996] R.J.Q. at 2992 (Can.) ("Le nouveau code
est donc moins exigeant en mati&e de prescription, car il suggre comme r~gle
g~n~rale une attitude de souplesse envers ceux qui sont dans l'impossibilit6
d'agir." ('The new code is then less demanding in the matter of prescription,
because it suggests as a general rule an attitude of flexibility towards those who
are in the impossibility to act.") (author's translation)).
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If the creditor had not filed the claim that interrupted the
prescription, due to deceitful activities of the debtor that
aimed to delay the prescription, the judges will be able to
apply what is established in this section.
97
This article formerly indicated that the filing of suit was due
immediately98 following the cessation of the factual impediment,99
though a revision to the article in 1968 (illustrated above) allowed
for a three month suspension of prescription following the removal
of the factual impediment.'
00
The determination of whether a factual impediment prevented a
plaintiff from meeting his prescriptive deadlines is to be made by the
judge in each particular case. Argentine courts have noted that
judges should exercise the utmost prudence in evaluating whether a
factual impediment exists. l 0l A significant portion of Argentine
97. C6DIGO CIVIL ARGENTINO [C6D. CIV.] art. 3980 (2007) (Arg.) (Agustin
Parise trans.), available at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/infoleglntemet/anexos/
105000109999/109481/texactley340_librolV_$3_titulol.htm ("Cuando por raz6n
de dificultades o imposibilidad de hecho, se hubiere impedido temporalmente el
ejercicio de una acci6n, los jueces estin autorizados a liberar al acreedor, o al
propietario, de las consecuencias de la prescripci6n cumplida durante el
impedimento, si despurs de su cesaci6n el acreedor o propietario hubiese hecho
valer sus derechos en el trrmino de tres meses. Si el acreedor no hubiere deducido
la demanda interruptiva de la prescripci6n por maniobras dolosas del deudor,
tendientes a postergar aqurlla, los jueces podrdn aplicar lo dispuesto en este
articulo.").
98. Regarding the understanding of "immediate," there have been different
jurisprudential interpretations.
99. Art. 3980 (Arg.) ("Cuando por raz6n de dificultades o imposibilidad de
hecho, se hubiere impedido temporalmente el ejercicio de una acci6n, los jueces
estfn autorizados a liberar al acreedor, o al propietario, de las consecuencias de la
prescripci6n cumplida durante el impedimento, si despu6s de su cesaci6n el
acreedor o propietario hubiese hecho valer sus derechos inmediatamente."
("When the enforcement of an action was temporarily impeded due to difficulties
or impossibility of fact, the judges are authorized to release the creditor, or the
owner, from the consequences of the prescription that occurred during the
impediment, if after its cessation the creditor or owner had exercised his rights
immediately.") (Agustin Parise trans.)).
100. Law No. 17.711, Apr. 26, 1968, [XXVIII-B] A.D.L.A. 1824 (Arg.).
101. See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN] [highest court on
constitutional and federal matters], 20/8/1991, "Olaverria, Armando N. c. Chaco,
Provincia del s/ dafios y perjuicios," El Derecho [E.D.] (1992-146-566) (Arg.);
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jurisprudence 1° 2 in the last thirty years commenting on article 3980
concerns a period between 1976 and 1983, when the military seized
control of the state with the Proceso de Reorganizaci6n Nacional
(Process of National Reorganization). 10 3 Just as Troplong argued
that the mere occurrence of a national crisis without more should not
suspend prescription for an entire nation,'0 4 Argentine courts were
unwilling to apply article 3980 in cases where only the state seizure,
without more, was the claimed reason for failing to comply with the
applicable prescriptive periods.'0 5 Courts must look at facts specific
to the individual litigant in evaluating whether a factual impediment
is sufficient to suspend prescription under article 3980.106 Although
the article does not mention "absolute impossibility in fact" as other
civil law jurisdictions do,' 0 7 Argentine courts are interested in
whether the factual impediment is of the variety that would prevent
CSJN, 16/8/1988, "Troiani, Pedro N. v. Ford Motor Argentina, S.A. s/ despido,"
Jurisprudencia Argentina [J.A.] (1988-111-87) (Arg.).
102. The search was composed from the following law journals: La Ley, El
Derecho, and Jurisprudencia Argentina.
103. Virgilio R. Beltrin, Political Transition in Argentina: 1982 to 1985, 13
ARMED FORCES & Soc'Y 215, 216 (1987) (discussing the process of national
reorganization).
104. 2 TROPLONG, supra note 73, NO. 728, at 299.
105. CSJN, 16/8/1988, "Troiani, Pedro N. v. Ford Motor Argentina, S.A.," J.A.
s/ despido (1988-111-87) (Arg.) (reasoning that the state seizure could not in and of
itself be a factual impediment to satisfying prescriptive periods because public
offices were open and people were able to continue their day-to-day activities).
106. See CSJN, 2/8/2000, "Columbia Cia. Financiera c. E.N. -Miro. De
Economia s/ proceso de conocimiento," E.D. (2000-189-453) (Arg.); CSJN,
16/08/1988, "Olivares, Jorge A. c. Estado Nacional Argentino," E.D. (1989-131-
719) (Arg.) ("[C]ircunstancias estas que deben ser apreciadas y coneretamente en
relaci6n con la persona del demandante y no por meras consideraciones de indole
general relatives a la situaci6n del pais, a la existencia de autoridades de facto, o la
applicaci6n por 6stas de un r6gimen de terrorismo de Estado." ("[C]ircumstances
must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis of the person requesting it and not by
generalized considerations such as a defacto regime or terrorist regime.") (Agustin
Parise trans.)).
107. For example, the Civil Code of Lower Canada formerly recognized that
"[p]rescription runs against all persons, unless they are included in some exception
established by this code, or unless it is absolutely impossible for them in law or in
fact to act by themselves or to be represented by others." C.C.B.-C. art. 2232
(1993) (Can.).
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a litigant from meeting his prescriptive period. In commenting on
whether sickness may constitute a factual impediment under article
3980, the Miguel, Rodolfo v. Agua y Energia El6ctrica court said it
is one thing to be sick, another to be so sick as to be unable to work,
and another to be so sick as to be unable to exercise an action.'
0 8
Ultimately, the article opens the possibility of equity according to
the criteria of the judicial decision.'0 9
The case of Troian, Pedro N. v. Ford. Motor Argentina S.A." 0
illustrates the judiciary's power to decide whether a factual
impediment warrants the suspension of prescription under article
3980 and when that factual impediment ceases to exist. The
plaintiff claimed he was unable to file suit and meet the applicable
prescriptive period"' because he had been illegitimately and
arbitrarily detained as a prisoner during the period of military siege
in the late 1970's and early 1980's." 2 The plaintiff was released
from prison on December 1, 1980, but claimed that he was further
prevented from filing suit until March 9, 1984,1 13 just after President
Rafil Alfonsin came to power and restored democracy on December
10, 1983.114 The court agreed that a factual impossibility continued
to exist for the plaintiff after his release from prison and during the
period of military control; however, the majority opinion identified
108. Cdmara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Federal de Rosario Sala B
[CNFed. Rosario-B] [federal court of appeals of Rosario], 4/12/1986, "Miguel,
Rodolfo H. c. Agua y Energia E16ctrica," E.D. (122-1987-749) (Arg.).
109. La Ley [L.L.], 29/3/1988, "Conti, Juan C. c. Ford Motor Argentina, S.A.,"
E.D. (Repertorio XLVII-1987-1287) (Arg.) (Agustin Parise trans.) ("El art. 3980
del C6d. Civil (Adla, XXVIII-B, 1799) abre una posibibilidad de equidad para
que, a criterio del decisorio judicial, se libere al pretensor de las consecuencias de
la prescripci6n: que 6sta haga valer sus derechos dentro de los tres meses
posteriors a la superaci6n del obst~culo.").
110. CSJN, 16/8/1988, "Troiani, Pedro N. v. Ford. Motor Argentina S.A. s/
despido," J.A. (1988-111-87) (Arg.).
11. Id.
112. Beltrdn, supra note 103, at 215-16 (discussing the demise of Argentina's
military government).
113. CSJN, 16/8/1988, "Troiani, Pedro N. v. Ford Motor Argentina, S.A. s/
despido," J.A. (1988-111-87) (Arg.).
114. CENTER FOR SOCIAL ANALYSIS OF THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
AT BINGHAMTON & THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, POLITICAL
HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD 23 (Arthur S. Banks ed., 1985).
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the date of the presidential election (October 30, 1983) 15 as the date
when the factual impossibility ceased to exist, whereas the dissent
marked the date President Rafil Alfonsin assumed power (December
10, 1983).116 That date is important, as article 3980 permits the
plaintiff up to three months to exercise his action after the removal
of his factual impediment. While the date identified by the majority
opinion rendered the plaintiffs action prescribed by more than three
months, the plaintiff would have been able to exercise his action a
day before it prescribed under the dissent's view.
The judicial discretion afforded by article 3980 and the spirit of
contra non valentem it embodies seems substantial, but it likewise
offers a more equitable solution to the suspension of prescription
superior to blanket legislative action. This is precisely the judicial
discretion that was warranted in the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita. Just as some Argentine litigants were more severely
affected by the military occupation than others, the hurricanes had a
wide range of effects on litigants throughout Louisiana. Had
Louisiana more enthusiastically embraced contra non valentem
instead of yielding to the legislative suspension of prescription,
judges would have equitably evaluated claims of factual
impediments to prescription on a case-by-case basis.
B. Suspending and Tolling Statutes ofLimitation in Common Law
Jurisdictions
An overview of how common law jurisdictions address
impediments to statutes of limitation is useful for the development
of the law in Louisiana, as Louisiana is a mixed jurisdiction of both
the civil and common law. This section evaluates the suspension of
statutes of limitation in four states: New York, for its exhaustively
detailed contingency plan for a state of emergency and how it was
implemented following the September 1 1th terrorist attacks;
Mississippi, for its solution to extend statutes of limitation following
Hurricane Katrina; California, as an outlier permitting the
retroactive revival of claims that expired under statutes of limitation;
115. Id.
116. CSJN, 16/8/1988, "Troiani, Pedro N. v. Ford. Motor Argentina S.A. s/
despido," J.A. (1988-111-87) (Arg.).
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and Florida, for its allowance of local courts to suspend or toll legal
deadlines.
1. New York
As unprepared as it would seem New York and the rest of the
world were for the terrorist attacks of September 11 th, New York
already had a comprehensive body of law available to state officials
in the event of such a disaster. 117  New York lawmakers had
prepared a provision addressing the suspension of statutes of
limitation in the event of a natural or man-made disaster, which
allowed the governor to issue an executive order "suspend[ing]
specific provisions of any statute, local law, ordinance, or orders,
rules or regulations, or parts thereof, of any agency during a state
disaster emergency, if compliance with such provisions would
prevent, hinder, or delay action necessary to cope with the
disaster."' 18  The statute limited the governor's power in many
ways, including a time limitation of thirty days"19 and a requirement
that the order deviate only minimally from the requirements of the
statute. 1
20
The day after the September 1lth attacks, Governor George
Pataki exercised his emergency power to issue a series of executive
orders, including Executive Order 113.7, to temporarily suspend the
statutes of limitation on civil actions "so far as it bars actions whose
limitation period concludes during the period commencing from the
date that the disaster emergency was declared . . . until further
notice. ' 1  A month later, the Governor cut off the general
suspension of the statutes of limitation but extended the suspension
117. N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 20-29-g (McKinney 2006).
118. Id. §29-a(l).
119. Id. § 29-a(2)(a) ("[N]o suspension shall be made for a period in excess of
thirty days, provided, however, that upon reconsideration of all of the relevant
facts and circumstances, the governor may extend the suspension for additional
periods not to exceed thirty days each .... ).
120. Id. § 29-a(2)(e) ("[A]ny such suspension order shall provide for the
minimum deviation from the requirements of the statute, local law, ordinance,
order, rule or regulation suspended consistent with the disaster action deemed
necessary .... ).
121. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.113 (2001).
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for those persons directly affected by the disaster until November 8,
2001, under Executive Order 113.28.122
To date, there have been no direct challenges to Executive
Orders 113.7 or 113.28 insofar as they suspend statutes of limitation
in any reported decisions. 123 Some litigants have incorrectly
interpreted the statute as a tolling provision; 12 however, courts have
clarified that the suspension of certain limitation periods applied
only to those claims that "concluded during the period the Executive
Order was in effect.'
' 25
Two issues are worth noting in connection with Governor
Pataki's order. First, it was imperative that the Governor, as a
representative of the executive branch, take action to suspend the
time period applicable to statutes of limitation because New York
law prohibits courts from "extend[ing] the time limited by law for
the commencement of an action."126  Second, the Governor's
immediate response barred any challenge to the retroactive revival
of expired claims. Governor Pataki's intrepid use of his authority
eliminated the need for litigants to apply anything resembling contra
non valentem (which is, of course, a doctrine foreign to New York).
One must consider that executive or legislative action is not always
so squarely applied. As effective as these executive orders were for
New York, non-judicial action is still plagued by the potential for
retroactivity, if not timely implemented, and overbreadth, if not
narrowly tailored.
122. Id.
123. Cf Paul G. Feinman & Brooks Holland, Grounds May Exist to Challenge
Orders Suspending Speedy Trials in Aftermath of September Attack, 74-Feb N.Y.
ST. B.J. 34, 35 (2002) (noting no reference in Executive Order 113.7 to the
governor seeking advice of the Disaster Preparedness Commission in accordance
with Executive Law § 29-a as a possible challenge to the validity of the order).
124. See, e.g., Scheja v. Sosa, 771 N.Y.S.2d 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(explaining that the Governor's Executive Order only suspended statutes of
limitation for claims that would have expired during the stated period and did not
operate as a tolling provision of general applicability interrupting any litigant's
statute of limitations). A tolling statute is defined as "[a] law that interrupts the
running of a statute of limitations in certain situations, as when the defendant
cannot be served with process in the forum jurisdiction." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1525 (8th ed. 2004).
125. See, e.g., Scheja, 771 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
126. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 201 (McKinney 2001).
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2. Mississippi
Mississippi's guidance on the suspension of statutes of
limitation is relevant in that, like Louisiana, its Gulf Coast
communities were significantly affected by Hurricane Katrina.
Despite its veteran experience with hurricanes,' 27 Hurricane Katrina
is the only storm to date that has caused Mississippi lawmakers to
take actions in response to the problems that would invariably
cripple its court system in certain areas.
On September 6, 2005 (one week after the storm struck), the
Supreme Court of Mississippi issued an emergency administrative
order to extend all legal deadlines and cancel oral arguments in the
Second (Southern) Supreme Court District 128 in addition to
authorizing trial courts to "exercise their sound discretion in
extending deadlines, rescheduling hearings and trials and any other
matters by case specific actions or by general orders . . . ." 9 The
court was careful not to overextend its power, as it explicitly stated
that it was without authority to extend statutes of limitation and that
"no extension granted or authorized [in the administrative order]
shall extend beyond the limitations of action set by statute."'
' 30
Over a month after Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the
Mississippi legislature amended a statute permitting the removal of
local governments in emergency situations to include "natural
disasters" as one such "emergency situation."' 3 1 The statute was
127. Eleven tropical depressions, tropical storms, or hurricanes have affected
the three Mississippi coastal counties (Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson) since
1956. NOAA Coastal Services Center, Historical Hurricane Tracks, http://maps.
csc.noaa.gov/hurricanes/viewer.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2007) (query "Place
name," "County,". "Category," "Distance (10)," and "Date").
128. MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-3-1 (West 2006) (explaining that the Second
Supreme Court District of Mississippi comprises the following counties: Adams,
Amite, Clarke, Covington, Forrest, Franklin, George, Greene, Hancock, Harrison,
Jackson, Jasper, Jefferson Davis, Jones, Lamar, Lawrence, Lincoln, Marion, Pearl
River, Perry, Pike, Simpson, Smith, Stone, Walthall, Wayne, and Wilkinson).
129. S. Ct. Miss. Admin. Order No. 2005-AD-00001 (Sept. 6,2005).
130. Id.
131. MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-7-1 (West 2006). Mississippi Code section 17-7-1
formerly only allowed for the removal of local governments during an emergency
resulting from the effects or anticipated effects of an enemy attack or a threat of an
enemy attack. MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-7-1 (West 2004). The Mississippi
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given retroactive effect to August 29th (the day Hurricane Katrina
struck). 132  The Mississippi legislature concurrently modified
statutes of limitation for claims set to expire between August 29,
2005 and October 6, 2005, in the Second (Southern) Supreme Court
District as follows:
(a) If the statute of limitations expired on or after Monday,
August 29, 2005, but before the effective date of this act,
then the time for filing a claim shall be extended to Friday,
December 30, 2005.
(b) If the statute of limitations expires on or after the
effective date of this act, but before Tuesday, November 29,
2005, then the time for filing a claim shall be extended to
Friday, December 30, 2005.131
Additionally, the Mississippi legislature permitted claims
properly filed in the rest of the state (the First and Third Supreme
Court Districts) to benefit from these time modifications upon a
showing that "but for the catastrophic effects of Hurricane Katrina,
the action would have been timely filed. '' 134 The order was effective
immediately upon its passage and, by the face of its text,
retroactively revived expired claims.135 To date, there are no known
or reported decisions challenging this legislation. Considering the
tendency of most jurisdictions to refuse to retroactively revive
expired claims, it is unlikely that a Mississippi court would find this
statute valid insofar as it breathes life back into claims beyond their
applicable limitation period. This is in fact the law in Mississippi,
where the only effect of legislation lengthening a statute of
limitation is to extend claims in the future or then existing claims-
not, to revive expired claims, regardless of the retroactive language
legislature amended the statute in 2005 to add "natural disaster" as an "emergency
situation." 2005 Miss. Laws 5th Ex. Sess. ch. 4.
132. 2005 Miss. Laws 5th Ex. Sess. ch. 8.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. S. Ct. Miss. Admin. Order No. 2005-AD-00001 (Sept. 6,2005).
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of the legislation.' 36 The Mississippi Supreme Court articulated this
distinction, noting that:
"[M]ost other jurisdictions recognize the authority of
legislatures to enlarge periods of limitation with respect to
existing claims, that is, claims not barred at the time of
elongation. This is consistent with our general principle that
an act remedial in its character embraces claims existing
when the act was passed." While not completely retroactive,
this exception gathers the claims pending at the time of the
statute's amendment and not barred by its previous
limitation and gives them the benefit of the longer
limitations period. 137
Likewise, Louisiana courts have specifically prohibited the
retroactive revival of prescribed claims, as will be discussed
shortly.1
38
3. California
The California legislature has taken two remarkable steps to
modify statutes of limitation arising out of the September 11th
terrorist attacks and the Northridge earthquake of 1994. In 2002, the
California legislature noted that its current one-year statute of
limitations period for "actions for assault, battery, or injury to, or for
the death of, a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another . . . [was] unduly short" and extended this period to two
years. 139 The legislature noted the "special injustice" of applying a
one-year statute of limitations against victims of the September 11 th
terrorist attacks by specifically applying the change in the law
retroactively to those victims. 40 Additionally, the law applies
136. Tie-Reace Hollingsworth ex. rel. McDonald v. City of Laurel, 808 So. 2d
950, 954 (Miss. 2002). See also Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Robinson, 876 So. 2d
337, 340 (Miss. 2004) ("[W]here an amended statute remedially lengthens a
statute of limitations, [we] will apply the amendment to existing causes." (citations
omitted)).
137. Tie-Reace, 808 So. 2d at 954 (citations omitted) (quoting Kilgore v.
Barnes, 508 So. 2d 1042, 1045 (Miss. 1987) (citations omitted)).
138. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
139. 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 448 (West).
140. Id.
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"regardless of whether that action lapsed or was otherwise barred by
time under California law .... It is important to note that,
although the law had retroactive application, its enactment on the
day before the first anniversary of the September 1lth terrorist
attacks avoided the retroactive revival of any expired claims.
42
Careful avoidance of reviving expired claims was not taken
when the California legislature modified statutes of limitation for
insurance claims arising out of the Northridge earthquake of 1994,
as it was the explicit intent of the California legislature to revive
expired claims in response to widespread mishandling of insurance
claims 143 when it set forth a new one-year statute of limitations from
January 1, 2001.1" The act applied only to those cases "in which an
insured contacted an insurer or an insurer's representative prior to
January 1, 2000, regarding potential Northridge earthquake damage"
and did not apply to claims that had been "litigated to finality" or
settled. 145 The statute's author intended for the statute to "provide
[those] individuals who . . .were victimized twice, (once by the
earthquake and a second time by their insurance companies) with a
reasonable 'second chance' to seek redress for their damages.'
146
The retroactivity of this law is startling, as it revives claims that
have been expired for nearly six years. This is so because California
law provides that
the one-year limitations period begins to run at the time of
the inception of the loss, which is "that point in time when
appreciable damage occurs and is or should be known to the
insured, such that a reasonable insured would be aware that
his notification duty under the policy has been triggered."' 147
141. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.10 (2003).
142. 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 448 (West).
143. Ashou v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 819, 827 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006).
144. 2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1090 (West).
145. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.9 (2001).
146. 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611, 627 n.21
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting S. 1899, 106th Cong. (as read by S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, July 6, 2000)).
147. Campanelli v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 798 P.2d 1230 (Cal.
1990)).
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In the case of the Northridge earthquake, the inception of the loss
was the day of the earthquake (January 17, 1994).148
California courts have maintained the validity of this retroactive
legislation against a number of challenges. Amidst concern that the
statute violated the contracts clauses of both the U.S. Constitution' 49
and the California Constitution,' 50 the court in Campanelli v.
Allstate Life Insurance Co. evaluated the statute under the standard
set out in Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light
Co.15 1 Energy Reserves held that a state regulation that creates a
substantial impairment of contract is constitutional if the state has a
"significant and legitimate public purpose behind the regulation."' 152
Finding such a significant public purpose in light of the "highly-
regulated nature of the California insurance industry and the
statutory underpinnings of the contractual limitations clause," the
Campanelli court held that the statute's "interference with contracts,
while substantial, is not so severe as to render the statute
unconstitutional."'
53
The court in 20th Century Insurance Co. v. Superior Court went
to great lengths to show that the California legislature "has the
power to expressly revive time-barred civil common-law causes of
action."1 54  The court noted that retroactive modification of the
statute was permissible because a mere "statute of limitations...
does not, upon its expiration, endow in the defendant a 'vested
right."" 55  It should be noted that this view is remarkably
distinguished from other 1jurisdictions and is expressly rejected in the
Louisiana jurisprudence.
148. Id.
149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ...pass any . . . law
impairing the obligation of contracts.").
150. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("[A] law impairing the obligation of contracts
may not be passed.").
151. Campanelli, 322 F.3d at 1098 (citing Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan.
Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1983)).
152. 459 U.S. at 411-12.
153. 322 F.3d at 1098-99.
154. 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611, 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Liebig v.
Superior Court, 257 Cal. Rptr. 574, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)).
155. Id. at 631 (emphasis in original).
156. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
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4. Florida
The frequent barrage of hurricanes in the state of Florida has
routinely caused court closures. Such events are undoubtedly not
only inconvenient for Floridians in general but also particularly
problematic for plaintiffs whose claims are set to expire under
applicable statutes of limitation. In light of major storms such as
Hurricane Andrew, which struck the Florida coast in 1992, the
Florida Supreme Court amended the Florida Rules of Court to allow
the Chief Justice to order court closures and to "suspend, toll, or
otherwise grant relief from time deadlines imposed by otherwise
applicable statues and rules of procedure for such period as may be
appropriate . . .157 The Chief Justice may make such orders
upon request of the chief judge of any circuit or district, or
sua sponte, in the event of natural disaster, civil
disobedience, or other emergency situation requiring the
closure of courts or other circumstances inhibiting the ability
of litigants to comply with deadlines imposed by rules of
procedure applicable in the courts of [Florida].158
The vast majority of court closures in Florida are the
consequence of hurricanes and tropical storms. Between 1999 and
2006, the Chief Justice issued 250 administrative orders extending
legal deadlines retroactively for state courts in response to
hurricanes or tropical storms, 159 though the Chief Justice has also
issued administrative orders for such non-hurricane related
emergencies as power outages, 16 anthrax scares, 16' bomb threats, 162
157. Amendments to the Florida Rules of Judicial Administration, 682 So. 2d
89, 93 (1996).
158. FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.030(a)(2)(B)(iv) (2006). In 2006, this rule was
renumbered as Rule 2.205(a)(2)(B)(iv), but is referred to as Rule 2.030 in the
administrative orders discussed infra.
159. These orders may be found at the website of the Florida Supreme Court
Clerk's Office, Administrative Orders, http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/
adminorders/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 13, 2007).
160. S. Ct. Fla. Admin. Order Nos. AOSC06-11 (Jun. 5, 2006), AOSC02-45
(Dec. 18, 2002), AOSCOO-38 (Oct. 5, 2000).
161. S. Ct. Fla. Admin. Order Nos. AOSC04-02 (Jan. 27, 2004), AOSC01-51,
-53 (Nov. 5, 2001), AOSC01-49 (Oct. 26, 2001).
162. S. Ct. Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC02-7 (Apr. 1, 2002).
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terrorist activity in general, 163 public demonstrations congesting
areas around courtroom facilities, 64 and even offensive odors.' 
65
Each of the Chief Justice's administrative orders was issued
after the actual courthouse closing; likewise, each order
retroactively modified legal deadlines for varying periods of time.' 
66
In addition to the specified deadline modifications, the majority of
administrative orders indicated that local courts may make case-by-
case determinations of special instances where an attorney needs to
further extend a legal deadline as a direct result of the named
impediment. 167 Furthermore, most administrative orders allow for a
local case-by-case determination to toll legal deadlines in areas not
listed in the order upon a showing that an attorney's lack of
compliance with the requisite time periods was directly attributable
to the named impediment.' The orders are essentially a hybrid of a
blanket suspension to the limitation period (the administrative order
identifying particular dates) and a case-by-case determination of
whether a particular litigant may benefit from a longer delay period.
The latter point embodies the principle of contra non valentem,
whereas the former point suffers the same problems of overbreadth
and impermissible retroactivity discussed throughout this Comment.
It is important to note that no reported decisions have challenged
the Florida Supreme Court's power to modify legal deadlines,
163. S. Ct. Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC01-44 (Sept. 12, 2001).
164. S. Ct. Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSCO3-45 (Nov. 13, 2003).
165. S. Ct. Fla. Admin. Order Nos. AOSC03-12 (Mar. 5, 2003), AOSC02-19
(Jul. 9, 2002).
166. See supra note 124 for a discussion on the distinction between tolling
periods and suspension.
167. See, e.g., S. Ct. Fla. Admin. Order No. AOSC05-78 (Nov. 1, 2005) ("This
Court recognizes that there may be instances where, because of this Hurricane,
these and other time limits in the Third District Court of Appeal could not be met
even after taking into consideration the tolling of the periods stated above. If such
a claim is made, it shall be resolved by the court wherein jurisdiction lies on a
case-by-case basis where a party demonstrates that the lack of compliance with
requisite time periods was directly attributable to this emergency situation.").
168. See, e.g., id. ("The Court likewise recognizes that cases outside the Third
District Court of Appeal may also be affected by this emergency situation.
Consequently, the tolling of time periods in cases outside of the Third District
Court of Appeal shall be permitted only where a party demonstrates that the lack
of compliance with requisite time periods was directly attributable to this
emergency situation.").
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including suspending or tolling statutes of limitation, under Florida
Rule of Judicial Administration 2.030(a)(2)(B)(iv); however, it is
well-settled in Florida that "although the legislature possesses the
power to extend the limitation period for an existing cause of action,
it lacks the authority to breathe life into a claim that is lifeless as a
result of a pre-existing statute."' 69 This is so because "[o]nce a
claim has been extinguished by the applicable statute of limitations,
the claim cannot be revived because a constitutionally protected
property right to be free from the claim has vested in the
defendant."' 70  It follows that the tolling or suspension periods
would have no enforceable effect on claims that expired during the
period of time the courthouse is closed.
Additionally, in keeping with a plain reading of jurisprudential
authority prohibiting the retroactive revival of expired claims, the
words nuncpro tunc 17 1 included in each of the administrative orders
would have no bearing on expired claims. What, then, is the effect
of a nunc pro tunc administrative order tolling or suspending
statutes of limitation for claims that have already expired? While it
is of no practical significance and likely not the true intent of the
rule, it is likely that administrative orders merely toll or suspend
statutes of limitation for active claims that have not yet expired.
In Florida, it is permissible for the legislature to extend statutes
of limitation for those claims that have not yet expired. 172  For
example, a claim with a one-year statute of limitation period that
accrues on September 1 st may benefit from an administrative order
tolling the statute of limitations for four days in response to a
169. Boyce v. Cluett, 672 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). See
also Wood v. Eli Lilly & Co., 701 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1997); Agency for Health Care
Admin. v. Assoc. Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996); In re Estate of
Smith, 685 So. 2d 1206, 1210 (Fla. 1996); Williams v. S.E. Fla. Cable, Inc., 782
So. 2d 988 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (indicating that a court may not
subsequently revive an extinguished claim).
170. In re Estate of Smith, 685 So. 2d at 1210. See also Mason v. Salinas, 643
So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 1994).
171. The Administrative Orders discussed are nunc pro tunc orders, which
means that they have "retroactive legal effect through a court's inherent power."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (8th ed. 2004).
172. Corbett v. Gen. Eng'g & Mach. Co., 37 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1948). See also
Ruhl v. Perry, 390 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1980); Gaines v. Orange County Pub. Util.,
710 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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hurricane in August, allowing the plaintiff's attorney until
September 5th of the following year to file a claim. Without further
judicial guidance, it is unclear what effect the administrative orders
have on claims set to expire during the court closures when issued
after the court closures. In any event, it is settled law that
retroactively reviving prescribed claims is prohibited in
Louisiana.1
73
Florida's veteran experience with hurricanes and the need for
judicial efficiency understandably favors a mechanism like Rule
2.030, which allows the Chief Justice to suspend or toll legal
deadlines for everyone in a designated locality. By allowing the
further extension of legal deadlines on a case-by-case basis, Florida
law recognizes the need for equity that is embodied in the doctrine
of contra non valentem. Louisiana's less frequent experience with
hurricanes does not warrant a procedure like the one Florida
implements so routinely; rather, contra non valentem is sufficiently
applicable to any factual impediment a Louisiana litigant might
encounter.
IV. CURRENT ISSUES WITH PRESCRIPTION AND CONTRA NON
VALENTEM IN LOuIsIANA
Legislative suspension of prescription presents two problems:
first, the legislature only has a narrow window of time within which
to suspend prescription before its action is either impermissibly
retroactive or neglects claims that prescribed during or after the
emergency event; and second, the issue giving rise to the suspension
invariably affects litigants in different ways.
A. Impermissibly Retroactive Legislative Suspension of Prescription
One of the most significant reasons why contra non valentem is
an important issue in Louisiana today is that Governor Blanco's
three successive executive orders' 74 and their legislative
173. See infra note 189.
174. 2005 La. Sess. Law Serv. Exec. Order Nos. 2005-32, -48, -67 (West).
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ratification 175 retroactively revived prescribed claims, effectively
depriving defendants of their vested rights.
Louisiana Civil Code article 6 explains, "In the absence of
contrary legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively
only. Procedural and interpretive laws apply both prospectively and
retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the
contrary."' 176 In commenting on the French Civil Code's version of
this article, Planiol stated the significance of the principle of non-
retroactivity:
It is the necessary safeguard of individual interests. There
would be no security for private persons, if their rights, their
fortune, their personal status, the effects of their acts and of
their contracts, could be questioned or modified or
suppressed at any moment because the law-maker had
changed his mind. 77
If the legislature does express an intent to apply a substantive
law retroactively, it may do so "only to the extent that it is
constitutionally permissible" 17 8 and only when there is an express
intent by the legislature for such an "extreme exercise of legislative
power." 179  If a law is procedural in nature, it may not apply
retroactively if it violates a vested right.180
It is first important to clarify the distinction between progressive
rights and vested rights. The former refers to rights that are in the
175. 2005 La. Acts No. 6, § I (enacting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5821-35
(2006)).
176. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 6 (2007). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1:2
("No Section of the Revised Statutes is retroactive unless it is expressly so
stated.").
177. 1 PLANIOL, supra note 69, NO. 240, at 173.
178. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 6 cmt. b (2007). See also Lott v. Haley, 370 So.
2d 521, 523 (La. 1979) ("[P]rocedural and remedial laws are not accorded
retroactive effect where such retroactivity would operate unconstitutionally to
disturb vested rights."); Guillory v. Guillory by & through Arceneaux, 615 So. 2d
975, 977 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993) ("The test for determining the constitutional
validity of a limitation statute is whether it allows a reasonable time for the
assertion of the right or the enforcement of the obligation; the legislature is
primarily the judge of the reasonableness of the time allowed.").
179. Cameron Parish Sch. Bd. v. Acands, Inc., 687 So. 2d 84, 91 (La. 1997)
(quoting Hopkins v. Lincoln Trust Co., 135 N.E. 267, 267 (1922)).
180. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 6 cmt. c (2007).
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process of being created, such as the right to ownership of land
through acquisitive prescription.' 8' The latter refers to rights that
have already been created, such as the right to avoid being sued after
a liberative prescriptive period has already expired. A "progressive
right" is thus not a right at all, but the term is useful to categorize
rights that have not yet fully matured.
One commentator has noted that changing the prescriptive
period while one is "in the process" of creating a right cannot be
said to apply retroactively. 182  Likewise, the suspension of
prescription of a suit that has not yet prescribed cannot be said to
have retroactively deprived one of a right because no right has yet
been created. Planiol described the same general reasoning, stating
that "a law is retroactive when it goes back to the past either to
evaluate the conditions of the legality of the act, or to modify or
suppress the effects of a right already acquired. Outside of those
conditions, there is no retroactivity."
8
Regarding retroactivity and prescriptive periods, Planiol stated
that "[w]hen a law modifies the duration of a prescription, either to
lengthen it or to shorten it, prescriptions already accrued are not
disturbed by it, but those which are running are affected by the
change."' 184 This distinction is incredibly important,
[flor while the defendant does not acquire anything during
the running of the prescriptive period, once the time period
has elapsed, the legislature grants the defendant the right to
plead the exception of prescription in order to defeat the
plaintiffs claim. Because the defendant acquires the right to
plead the exception of prescription, a change in that right
181. J.-R. Trahan, Time for a Change: A Call to Reform Louisiana's
Intertemporal Conflicts of Law (Law of Retroactivity of Laws), 59 LA. L. REv.
661, 726 (1999). The term "progressive right" does not identify a right per se, but
rather categorically describes what has become a right after the passage of time.
Id
182. Id. at 726-27.
183. 1 PLANIOL, supra note 69, NO. 243, at 174. This reasoning has been
adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Elevating Boats, Inc. v. St. Bernard
Parish, 795 So. 2d 1153, 1163 (La. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Anthony
Crane Rental v. Fruge, 859 So. 2d 631 (La. 2003).
184. 1 PLANIOL, supra note 69, NO. 248, at 177-78. This reasoning has been
adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Elevating Boats, 795 So. 2d at 1163.
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constitutes a substantive change in the law as applied to the
defendant. 1
85
Louisiana courts have permitted the shortening and lengthening
of prescriptive periods but have given greater scrutiny to the
modification of a plaintiff's "vested rights" than a defendant's
"progressive rights." Extending a plaintiffs prescriptive period
before his claim prescribes gives the plaintiff more time to exercise
his vested right, while it merely lengthens the requisite delay period
for a defendant to exercise his progressive right (i.e., a pending right
that is not yet vested). The court in Elevating Boats, Inc. v. St.
Bernard Parish explained this reasoning by stating that an "extended
prescriptive period does not negatively affect any rights that have
accrued in favor of any party [because] the injured party... is the
only party with any rights in the pursuit of the cause of action."
'1 86
Judges have more rigorously evaluated statutes that shorten
prescriptive periods because they substantially modify a plaintiff's
vested right while accelerating the time needed for a defendant to
turn his progressive right into a vested right. 187 If the legislature
shortens the time period for a plaintiff to bring an action, the
legislative action must pass constitutional muster by "allow[ing] a
reasonable time for the assertion of the right or the enforcement of
the obligation .... Unless the time allowed is so short as to amount
to a denial of justice, the courts will not interfere."' 88 This exercise
by the courts is undoubtedly a double standard in favor of the
plaintiff; however, it serves to accent the important distinction
between progressive rights and vested rights, for when a plaintiff's
claim has expired, the defendant has acquired a vested right that
may not be abrogated by the legislature. Relying on well-
established jurisprudence and doctrine, the Louisiana Supreme
185. Chance v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 635 So. 2d 177, 178 (La. 1994)
(citations omitted) (citing LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 927, 934 (1994)).
186. 795 So. 2dat 1163.
187. See id. at 1163 n. 12 (citing Falgout v. Dealers Truck Equip. Co., 748 So.
2d 399, 407-08 (La. 1999); Lott v. Haley, 370 So. 2d 521, 524 (La. 1979)).
188. W.R.M. v. H.C.V., 923 So. 2d 911, 914 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Guillory v. Guillory by & through Arceneaux, 615 So. 2d 975, 977 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1993) (citations omitted)), vacated, 951 So. 2d 172 (La. 2007). See also Lott
v. Haley, 370 So. 2d 521, 524 (La. 1979) (refusing to retroactively apply a
prescriptive period where it would deprive a plaintiff of his vested right).
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Court ruled in Elevating Boats that "the Legislature is without the
authority to revive a prescribed claim."1 89
Despite this clear language, Governor Kathleen Blanco' 9 ° and
the Louisiana legislature expressly suspended prescriptive and
peremptive periods for those claims that did or would have expired
after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita:
A. All prescriptions, including liberative, acquisitive, and
the prescription of nonuse, and all peremptive periods shall
be subject to a limited suspension and/or extension during
the time period of August 26, 2005, through January 3,
2006; however, the suspension and/or extension of these
periods shall be limited and shall apply only if these periods
would have otherwise lapsed during the time period of
August 26, 2005, through January 3, 2006. This limited
suspension and/or extension shall terminate on January 3,
2006, and any right, claim, or action which would have
189. 795 So. 2d at 1164 (citing Bouterie v. Crane, 616 So. 2d 657, 664 n.15
(La. 1993); Hall v. Hall, 516 So. 2d 119, 120 (La. 1987)) (emphasis added). See
also Raymond v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 856 So. 2d 27, 36 (La. App. 4th Cir.
2003) ("At the time the second amended petition was filed, the School Board had
obtained a vested right in being able to assert the exception of prescription.
Therefore, based upon the jurisprudence of this State and due to the procedural
mistakes discussed herein, La. R.S. 14(2)(13)(nn) may not be utilized to revive the
appellants' claim.").
190. 2005 La. Sess. Law Serv. Exec. Order Nos. 2005-32, -48, -67 (West).
While the Governor claimed to have acted within her power during a state of
emergency under Louisiana Revised Statutes section 29:724, there is nothing in
that statute explicitly indicating that the Governor has the power to suspend
prescription. Furthermore, Louisiana Civil Code article 3457 indicates that
"[t]here is no prescription other than that established by legislation." LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 3457 (2007). Perhaps recognizing the governor's lack of power to
suspend prescription, the legislature ratified her three executive orders "to prevent
injustice, inequity, and undue hardship to persons who were prevented by these
hurricanes from timely access to courts and offices in the exercise of their legal
rights, including the filing of documents and pleadings as authorized or required
by law." 2005 La. Acts No. 6, § 1 (enacting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5821-35
(2006)). The Louisiana Supreme Court issued a resolution on October 3, 2005
recognizing the Governor's first two executive orders and permitted judges of any
Louisiana court to shorten or suspend periods outlined in those orders. While this
resolution was recognized by the governor's third executive order, the legislature's
ratification of the Governor's executive orders makes no mention of the Louisiana
Supreme Court's resolution.
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expired during the time period of August 26, 2005, through
January 3, 2006, shall lapse on January 4, 2006.
B. The provisions of Subsection A shall not apply to any
matter concerning the prescription of nonuse applicable to
mineral servitudes, mineral royalty interests, and executive
rights and shall be governed by the Louisiana Mineral Code
and are not subject to the suspension provisions in this
Section. 191
Louisiana courts have entertained the idea of reviving prescribed
actions when there has been legislative action but have declined to
do so absent a clear and unequivocal intent by the legislature.' 92 In
fact, no Louisiana court has ever revived a prescribed claim based
on legislative action. While the period following the 2005
hurricanes was the first time that the Louisiana legislature gave a
sufficiently clear and unequivocal expression of intent to revive a
prescribed claim, there is no judicial precedent tending towards its
validity other than an indication that a court would "at the very least
require'' 193 such an expression of legislative intent. Rather, the law
in Louisiana is that "the Legislature is without the authority to
revive a prescribed claim."' 194 This is so because the right to raise
the exception of prescription is a vested right in the defendant, and
"even where the legislature has expressed its intent to give a law
191. § 9:5822 (emphasis added).
192. See Cameron Parish Sch. Bd. v. Acands, Inc., 687 So. 2d 84, 91 (La.
1997) (refusing to revive an already prescribed cause of action absent a clear and
unequivocally expressed intent by the legislature); Chance v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., Inc. 635 So. 2d 177, 178 (La. 1994) ("[W]e require, at the very least, a clear
and unequivocal expression of intent by the legislature for such an 'extreme
exercise of legislative power."' (quoting Hopkins v. Lincoln Trust Co., 135 N.E.
267, 267 (1922))); In re Succession of Faget, 938 So. 2d 1003, 1007 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 2006) ("[T]he act does not clearly and unequivocally express an intent to have
the act apply retroactively to revive a right. We therefore do not apply it
retroactively to revive... [the] prescribed claim."); Succession of McKay, 921 So.
2d 1219, 1223 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2006) (refusing to apply a statute retroactively
without clear and unequivocal express intent by the legislature to do so).
193. Chance, 635 So. 2d at 178.
194. See supra note 189.
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retroactive effect, that law may not be applied retroactively if it
would... disturb vested rights."' 9' 5
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently evaluated the
constitutionality of Acts 739196 and 802,197 which extended
prescription for insurance claims arising out of damage caused by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.'" On July 10, 2006, the Louisiana
Attorney General filed suit in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court
to seek declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the Acts.' 99
The Louisiana Supreme Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction
over the matter and remanded the case to the Nineteenth Judicial
District Court for an expedited hearing.200 On August 23, 2006,
Judge Bates of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court ruled in favor
of the State. The Louisiana Attorney General sought review of
the case on August 24, 2006; the supreme court heard oral
202
arguments the next day and affirmed the district court ruling.
It is important to note that the insurance legislation did not
revive any prescribed claims whereas the blanket legislation under
195. Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 10 (La. 2001) (citing
Keith v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar., 694 So. 2d 180, 183 (La. 1997)); Rousselle v.
Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd., 633 So. 2d 1235, 1244 (La. 1994); Segura v. Frank,
630 So. 2d 714, 721 (La. 1994). See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Smith, 609 So. 2d 809, 816 n.ll (La. 1992); Lott v. Haley, 370 So. 2d 521, 523
(La. 1979); A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 2, in 4 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 6 (3d ed. 2004) ("Retroactive application of a new law is
constitutionally permissible if it does not result in impairment of. . . vested
rights.").
196. 2006 La. Acts No. 739.
197. 2006 La. Acts No. 802.
198. State v. All Prop. & Cas. Ins. Carriers Authorized & Licensed to Do Bus.
in State, 937 So. 2d 313, 317 (La. 2006) ("As a further response to the
extraordinary circumstances faced by many Louisiana citizens, the Louisiana
Legislature enacted House Bill 1289 and House Bill 1302, now known as Acts
2006, Nos. 739 and 802, which extend the prescriptive period within which
citizens may file certain claims under their insurance policies for losses occasioned
by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Prior to these amendments, Louisiana law held
that no insurance contract issued in Louisiana could limit the right of action
against an insurer to a period less than twelve months. See La. R.S.
22:629(A)(3).").
199. Id.
200. Id. at318.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 327.
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Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:5822 did.20 3 Acts 739 and 802
were effective before the anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, and the
Louisiana Supreme Court declared them to be constitutional just
four days before the anniversary of the storm.20 4 Thus, Acts 739 and
802 did not revive any prescribed claims because no claim would
have prescribed until after the anniversary of the first storm
(Hurricane Katrina). The judgment in favor of the state allowed
insurance policyholders an additional year to exercise their vested
rights, whereas the defendant-insurance carriers' progressive rights
had not yet become vested rights. The court recognized this
distinction, noting that "in Chance, this court was faced with
legislation which, in effect, revived an already prescribed claim.
Here, the legislation at issue has the effect of extending a
prescriptive period., 20 5 The court further noted that "even where the
legislature has expressed its intent to give a substantive law
retroactive effect, the law may not be applied retroactively if it
would... disturb vested rights." 20
6
A Louisiana district court addressed the validity of the
legislature's retroactive revival of prescribed claims under section
9:5822 in Carmena v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's Office.20 7
In that case, Judge Timothy Kelley granted the defendants'
exception of prescription to the plaintiffs' claim for conversion with
prejudice. 208 The defendants relied on the Supreme Court's holding
in Elevating Boats and Chance in arguing that the plaintiffs' claim
prescribed one year after the date of the claimed incident20 9 and
could not have been suspended by an unconstitutional executive
203. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5822 (2006).
204. All Prop., 937 So. 2d at 330.
205. Id. at 323 (citing Chance v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 635 So. 2d 177
(La 1994)).
206. Id. at 322 (quoting Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 10
(La. 2001)). See also sources cited supra note 195.
207. No. 538-362 (19th Jud. Dist. Ct., Jun. 19, 2006).
208. Id.
209. Brief of Petitioner at 1, Carmena v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sheriff's
Office, No. 538-362 (19th Jud. Dist. Ct., Nov. 28, 2006). The plaintiff's petition
alleges that the incident of conversion occurred on October 24, 2004. Id. at 2. The
petition was filed on November 28, 2005. Id. at 1.
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order by the Governor or by the legislature's retroactive revival of a
prescribed action.
210
The Carmena case came before the Louisiana Supreme Court211
under the court's appellate jurisdiction over trial court
determinations of constitutionality. 212 Unfortunately, the trial court
did not make any determination as to constitutionality.213 Thus, the
Louisiana Supreme Court properly determined that it had no basis to
exercise its appellate jurisdiction and refused to review the case
further.2 14
A handful of Louisiana cases have applied the Governor's
executive orders and their ratification by the legislature to legal
deadlines, but no Louisiana case directly addressed the issue of
retroactively reviving prescribed claims.2 5 There are likely many
210. Defendant's Memorandum, Carmena, supra note 12, at 6 (citing
Elevating Boats, Inc. v. St. Bernard Parish, 795 So. 2d 1153, 1163 (La. 2001),
overruled on other grounds by Anthony Crane Rental v. Fruge, 859 So. 2d 631
(La. 2003); Chance v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 635 So. 2d 177, 178 (La.
1994)).
211. Carmena v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sheriffs Office, 947 So. 2d 715 (La.
2007).
212. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(D).
213. Carmena, 947 So. 2d 715.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., State v. Schnyder, 937 So. 2d 396, 399 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2006)
(considering an appeal, which was otherwise untimely on its face, as timely in
light of the Governor's executive orders); State v. Knowles, No. 06-821, 2006 WL
3804585, at *2 (La. App. 1st Cir. Dec. 28, 2006) (granting defendant's request for
a continuance on the grounds of Katrina-related hardship); Fox Electric, L.L.C. v.
Moghimi, 939 So. 2d 604, 605-06 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2006) (allowing a pro se
plaintiff an "[e]nlargement of [tlime" because he was unable to reach his attorney
and unable to access his files, which had been forwarded to a contact person in
New Orleans who was also unreachable). It should be noted that these cases do
not address prescription, but rather, extension of legal deadlines. As such,
concerns of retroactivity are distinguished. See also Smith v. Avant Garde
Homeowners Ass'n, Inc., 945 So. 2d 89, 90-91 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2006), in which
the court denied a third party defendant's peremptory exception of prescription to
a third party plaintiff's demand, filed on November 23, 2005, which was the
subject of a claim filed June 14, 2005 for an injury sustained on June 14, 2004, on
the basis of the Governor's executive orders. It is important to note that, while the
court "den[ied] the exception of prescription," the court likely intended to deny the
"untimeliness of the legal deadline" for bringing a third party demand. Id, at 91.
The distinction is an important one, as periods of prescription and peremption are
different from legal deadlines. Id.
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prescribed claims that would have benefited from legislative revival,
but the correct ruling of the lower court in Carmena and the
likelihood that other courts would follow this reasoning renders such
retroactive revival impermissible.
B. Overbreadth in Legislative Suspension of Prescription
The second major complication in using legislative action to
suspend prescription is that it is invariably overbroad. While it is
true that the legislature may narrowly tailor its mandate, the
judiciary is generally in the best position to review the facts and
decide whether one's case is worthy of suspension. Two legislative
decrees are at issue: a law prospectively extending suspension
against insurance carriers in favor of policyholders suffering damage
as a result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and the statewide
legislation suspending prescriptive and peremptive periods for
claims that either prescribed or were about to prescribe following
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
1. Suspension of Prescription Against Insurance Carriers
Even though the court in State v. All Property and Casualty
Insurance Carriers Authorized and Licensed to Do Business in
State2 16 was not pressed to revive a prescribed claim, it did need to
address whether statewide legislation suspending prescription in
favor of insurance policyholders whose claims arose out of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was preferable to the exercise of contra
non valentem. The Attorney General conceded in discussing the
applicability of contra non valentem that "the situation created by
the 2005 hurricane season, as it pertains to the ability of affected
individuals to timely file property damage claims, is precisely the
type of circumstance that may cause a court to invoke this
doctrine.,2 17 The Attorney General discussed contra non valentem
216. 937 So. 2d 313 (La. 2006).
217. Memorandum in Support of the State of Louisiana's Petition for
Declaratory Judgment at 11, State v. All Prop. & Cas. Ins. Carriers Authorized &
Licensed to Do Bus. in State, 937 So. 2d 313 (La. 2006) (No. 06-2030) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter Attorney General's Memorandum, All Prop.].
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in order to support the policy considerations of the legislature in
extending prescription for insurance claims, noting that
[f]or the same reasons that courts often bring into play the
doctrine of conta non valentem, the Legislature felt that an
essential aspect of the recovery effort from Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita included giving to the victims of these
storms a reasonable opportunity and timeframe within which
to bring claims for property damage under their insurance
policies. 2
18
Likewise, the defendant-insurance carriers argued that
the Acts at issue were unnecessary as Louisiana law already
contains the means for persons prevented from filing suit to
avoid dismissal of their claims due to prescription.
Specifically, the defendants point out that the doctrine of
contra non valentem applies to prevent the running of
liberative prescription where, in fact and for good cause, a
plaintiff is unable to exercise his cause of action when it
accrues.219
The Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with the Attorney General
that legislative action was preferable to the "mass confusion and an
increase in filing in our courts" that would result from the case-by-
case approach required by contra non valentem.
220
The fact that contra non valentem requires a tedious case-by-
case analysis is undeniable. The legislature recognized this problem
and perhaps related issues, such as inconsistent verdicts, and
"addressed this significant public concern in an appropriate
manner." 22 But what must be considered is that this legislation was
narrowly tailored to a single class of plaintiffs: insurance
policyholders having claims arising out of damage caused by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Given the highly regulated nature of
the insurance industry and how the statute applied to a narrow class
of plaintiffs whose claims arose from substantially similar factual
scenarios, it is understandable that the state would veer away from
218. AIlProp., 937 So. 2d at 327 n.13.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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contra non valentem to avoid inconsistent verdicts in this particular
setting.
2. Statewide Legislation Suspending Prescriptive and
Peremptive Periods
The statewide blanket suspension of prescription presents a
grossly overbroad legislative mandate. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
may have affected the entire state, but it was clearly more
destructive to South Louisiana than to other parts of the state. Just
as Troplong cautioned, the mere presence of a statewide crisis such
as war cannot, in and of itself, present a condition so deleterious as
to warrant the statewide suspension of prescription.222 The issue
becomes whether a case-by-case application of contra non valentem
is preferable to the suspension of prescription for the entire state for
more than a third of the year.
It is important to clarify that this retroactive modification of
prescription did not merely pertain to those days when courthouses
were closed as a result of the two hurricanes. Those days for which
a clerk of court closed his office were considered legal holidays
2 23
222. 2 TROPLONG, supra note 73, NO. 728, at 299.
223. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1:55(E)(2) ("If an emergency situation develops
which, in the judgment of the clerk of court, renders it hazardous or otherwise
unsafe for employees of the office of the clerk to continue in the performance of
their official duties or for the general public to conduct business with the clerk's
office, the clerk, with prior approval from the clerk's chief judge or other person
authorized to exercise his authority, may order the closing of his office for the
duration of the hazardous or unsafe condition. No such closure shall be effective
nor shall such period of closing be considered a legal holiday unless prior written
approval or written confirmation from such chief judge or person acting on his
behalf is received by the clerk of court. When the office is reopened, the clerk
shall have published as soon as possible a legal notice in all of the official parish
journals of the parishes within the district setting forth the dates of closure, the
hour of closure if applicable, the reasons for closure, and a statement that, pursuant
to R.S. 1:55(E)(3), these days or parts of days were legal holidays. The clerk shall
attach a similar statement to every document, petition, or pleading filed in the
office of the clerk on the first day or part of a day his office is open after being
closed under the provisions of this Paragraph, whenever the petition or document
relates to a cause of action, right of appeal, or other matter against which
prescription could have run or time periods imposed by law could have expired.").
See, e.g., N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Gabus, 877 So. 2d 1183 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2004)
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and were not included in the computation of time for purposes of
prescription. 224  The consequences of this legislative action are
much more significant. For a period of months, claims that were
scheduled to have lapsed were given a grace period despite most
courts having been open either immediately following the storm or
shortly thereafter. While it is true that a number of courts in the
most heavily devastated areas of South Louisiana remained closed
225for a lengthy period of time, most Louisiana courts opened within
days or weeks.226  Many courts never closed.227  Nevertheless,
plaintiffs throughout the entire state whose claims were set to
prescribe between August 26th and January 3rd benefited from a
suspension of prescription through January 3rd.228
In light of the impact of the two hurricanes on the state's judicial
system as a whole, a blanket suspension of prescription was
inappropriate. The legislature carved out its decree with an axe
when a scalpel was appropriate. It is almost inconceivable that a
Shreveport litigant was sufficiently affected by the storm to require
a suspension of prescription for more than four months. On the
other hand, it is understandable that some New Orleans area litigants
continued to be unable to file claims even with the lengthy grace
period.
(recognizing that Hurricane Lili forced the Fifteenth Judicial District Court in
Lafayette Parish to close for five days and constituted legal holidays).
224. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 3454 (2007) ("In computing a prescriptive
period, the day that marks the commencement of prescription is not counted.
Prescription accrues upon the expiration of the last day of the prescriptive period,
and if that day is a legal holiday, prescription accrues upon the expiration of the
next day that is not a legal holiday.").
225. For example, the Jefferson Parish Clerk of Court closed the courthouse as
a result of Hurricane Katrina from August 26, 2005 through the middle of
October. Telephone Interview with the Clerk of Court for Jefferson Parish (Sept.
15, 2006).
226. For example, the Rapides Parish Clerk of Court closed the courthouse as a
result of Hurricane Rita for a day and a half. Rapides Parish Clerk of Court,
Motion for Emergency Closure of Office (Sept. 22, 2005).
227. For example, neither Bossier nor Caddo Parish courts closed. Telephone
Interview with the Clerks of Court for Bossier Parish and Caddo Parish (Sept. 15,
2006).
228. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5822 (2006) (emphasis added).
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These are precisely the hypothetical situations that jurists like
Carbonnier and Martineau believed were merely academic for the
purposes of testing out applications of contra non valentem.
229
Confidence in their legislatures to take affirmative measures to
suspend prescription handicapped any further discussion on the
230issue.
It is undeniable that the statewide suspension of prescription in
the months following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita was an easy
solution to a complex problem. Courts were not burdened with
deciding whether one litigant's factual impediment to meeting a
prescriptive deadline was more worthy of suspension than another's.
It is also understandable that a case-by-case approach is vulnerable
to inconsistent verdicts. This is the argument of the cynic who fails
to recognize the value of the judiciary.
Judges, not legislators, are in the best position to decide whether
a litigant's factual impediments to meeting his prescriptive deadline
warrants suspension. Perhaps the legislature would address the
suspension of prescription for every conceivable cause of action if it
could. For example, residents of Bossier Parish would benefit from
a one-week suspension of prescription, whereas Jefferson Parish
residents would get an additional month to file suit. The legislature
could further narrow its declaration by the type of claim-maybe
declaring that all conversion suits in Orleans Parish benefit from a
three month suspension of prescription, whereas all trespass suits are
limited to two months of suspension in St. Bernard Parish.
Greater legislative specificity might yield more equitable results,
but we cannot possibly require our legislature to tailor laws
229. CARBONNIER, supra note 27, at 171; MARTINEAU, supra note 71,NO. 216,
at 218-19.
230. CARBONNIER, supra note 27, at 171; MARTINEAU, supra note 71, NO. 216,
at 218-19 ("En France, des lois sprciales ont W adoptres pour suspendre les
prescriptions durant les guerres de 1914-1918 et de 1939-1945. Le 1dgislateur
qudbrcois agirait sans doute de meme dans une situation identique; la question de
determiner si la guerre et l'invasion constituent des cas d'impossibilitd d'agir
prendrait alors un caractre acaddmique." ("In France, the special laws were
adopted in order to suspend prescription during the wars of 1914-1918 and of
1939-1945. The Qurbrcois legislature would react, without doubt, in the same
way in an identical situation; the question to determine if the war and the invasion
constitute cases of impossibility to act would be academic in character.") (author's
translation)).
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suspending prescription for every conceivable scenario. Such is the
function of the judiciary: to address these specific types of issues on
a case-by-case basis. As ex ante planners, the legislature cannot
possibly address fact-intensive cases like the judiciary can. To say
that the application of contra non valentem would create "mass
confusion and an increase in filings in our courts"231 insofar as it
applies to any and all claims is to deny the function of our courts.
Judicial efficiency is undoubtedly valuable; however, we must be
careful not to fold to it without giving due consideration to equity.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Because of the complexities raised by legislative retroactivity
and overbreadth-and in light of the approaches and experiences of
foreign civil and common law jurisdictions-the Louisiana
approach to contra non valentem must be revisited and revived in
cases where there is a factual impediment to prescription.
Some jurisdictions, such as New York, have well-conceived
bodies of law in their arsenal in the event of a crisis, but these laws
work only insofar as there is affirmative legislative or executive
action immediately following the crisis. Legislative or executive
suspension of prescription is problematic because the legislature has
only a narrow window within which to suspend prescription before
its action is either impermissibly retroactive or neglects claims that
prescribed during or after the emergency event. Additionally, the
constraints of ex ante planning give some litigants a windfall while
the plight of other litigants is not sufficiently redressed.
The issue giving rise to the suspension invariably affects
different litigants in different ways. Judges are in the best position
to evaluate cases in the most equitable way, and the doctrine of
contra non valentem makes this possible. Jurisdictions recognizing
contra non valentem strictly interpret what constitutes a factual
impediment, which is warranted considering the value of
prescription and the significance of being able to know when an
action ceases to exist.
231. State v. All Prop. & Cas. Ins. Carriers Authorized & Licensed to Do Bus.
in State, 937 So. 2d 313, 327 n.13 (La. 2006).
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A model approach to contra non valentem, insofar as it concerns
factual impediments, should:
(1) deviate minimally from the applicable prescriptive period;
(2) allow the judge to equitably evaluate the merits of the factual
impediment in a way that is neither indiscriminate nor overly
restrictive;
(3) provide as much certainty as possible in determining the
cessation of the suspension of prescription; and
(4) clarify that the suspension of prescription applies only for
those actions that would have prescribed during the existence of
the factual impediment or shortly after the removal of the factual
impediment.
For these reasons, I recommend that Louisiana law recognize the
following:
When a factual impossibility prevents a person entitled to
exercise an action from exercising his right, the action shall
not prescribe until one week from the day the impediment
ceases to exist. This suspension of prescription shall apply
equally to peremption notwithstanding Louisiana Civil Code
article 3461. This section shall apply to all modes of
prescription, including liberative, acquisitive, and non-use.
This proposed article affords the person entitled to an action
with the ability to exercise his right when an impossibility to act in
fact would otherwise cause the right to prescribe. It deviates
minimally from the applicable prescriptive period by affording
merely the suspension of prescription for actions that were set to
prescribe during the existence of the factual impediment or shortly
thereafter. It is important that the article afford a period of time for
the owner of the action to exercise his right after the cessation of the
impediment for two reasons: (1) it provides the owner of the action
with an equitable and reasonable period of time to return to the
action after the hiatus; and (2) it helps to reassert certainty in the
prescriptive period after the cessation of an uncertain suspension.
The one-week extension admittedly introduces an ex ante
component that much of this Comment has argued against, but it is
important to note that the one-week extension is not triggered until
the cessation of the factual impediment. The duration of a factual
546 [Vol. 68
COMMENTS
impediment may be longer for some litigants than others. For
example, the factual impediment for the solidly upper-middle class
lawyer from New Orleans who evacuated to Baton Rouge during
Hurricane Katrina would have ceased to exist when the Orleans
parish courts reopened and he was able to return home. The
duration of the impediment would be much longer for the
impoverished resident of New Orleans' Lower Ninth Ward who was
airlifted from his roof to a Red Cross shelter. Because he has been
working a minimum wage job seven states away in order to afford a
ticket home, his factual impediment would continue to suspend
prescription. At some point, the impediment ceases to exist, and the
litigant can revisit his case. The additional week after the cessation
of the impediment allows the litigant a reasonable amount of time to
revisit the case instead of having to march to the courthouse on the
day that everything returns to normal.
The uncertainty of how to address the issue of prescription in the
weeks and months following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita illustrates
the need for clarity in the law. Jurists such as Carbonnier and
Martineau were too quick to discount hypothetical applications of
contra non valentem when a factual impossibility to act suspended
prescription. Instead, we must be reminded of the most fundamental
application of contra non valentem as Irenius proposed:
"[p]raescription non currit in his qui se velint agere non possunt"
("prescription does not run in the case of those who find themselves
unable to act").232 Should Louisiana face another crisis like those
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, courts should revisit the
doctrine that has been polished with antiquity throughout the civil
law world: contra non valentem agere non currit praescriptio
("prescription does not run against one who is unable to act").
Benjamin West Janke*
232. See BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & TISSIER, supra note 55, NO. 367 n.2, at
192.
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